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POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS AND CONDUITS AFTER
CHARLES KEATING AND EMILY's LIST: AN
INCREMENTAL APPROACH TO REFORMING FEDERAL
CAMPAIGN FINANCE
I. INTRODUCTION
The rise of intermediaries who bundle campaign contributions
for candidates has coincided with a period of political upheaval
and cynicism in America. Circumvention of the law has been facil-
itated and promoted by a Congress driven by reelection motives.
Bundling, brokering, and earmarking are terms used to describe
fundraising activities that involve the arrangement of individual
contributions by third parties for a candidate as a means of circum-
venting the statutory limits for contributions.' Since the mid-1980s,
there has been growth in the utilization of this practice by political
committees,2 individuals, and political parties. Although Congress
has attempted to enact comprehensive campaign reform, it has
continually proposed exemptions that circumvent true reform.
This Note argues that comprehensive campaign reform is
doomed to failure due to structural problems that prevent compre-
hensive reform from occurring. Despite a definite need for reform,
the last significant amendment to the Federal Election Campaign
Act occurred in 1979. Campaign reform must be conducted on a
micro level, focusing on modifying the practice of bundling
through incremental reforms. Greater openness in elections and
increased participation by the electorate may result from reforms
that seek full disclosure of contributors and contributions by politi-
1. To simplify the discussion, this Note advocates regulating bundling, which includes
the related activities of brokering and earmarking.
2. "Political committee" includes any organization that engages in political fundraising
including those that are not officially organized. The statutory definition of political com-
mittee is broad enough to include virtually any group that raises political funds whether it
is formally established or not. See infra note 4.
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cal committees to congressional candidates. To improve the system
of campaign finance in the United States, all intermediaries, wheth-
er political committees or individuals, must be subject to the same
regulations.
This Note is structured as follows. Section II discusses the
treatment of contributions made through intermediaries or conduits.
The history of bundling and the failure of past reforms are ad-
dressed. The history of campaign finance law since 1974 is ana-
lyzed in section III. Section IV discusses the fundamental reasons
why comprehensive attempts by Congress to reform campaign
finance have failed. The need for a theoretical framework in devel-
oping any reform is the subject of section V. In section VI the role
of bundling in federal elections is analyzed. The need for address-
ing reform incrementally beginning with bundling reform is pre-
sented. Finally, a proposal for reform is made in section VII.
II. CURRENT CAMPAIGN FINANCE REQUIREMENTS
Before analyzing needed campaign finance reform, it is neces-
sary to discuss the law as it currently regulates campaigns for
federal office. All candidates and most political committees in-
volved in federal elections are subject to strict reporting require-
ments and contribution limits; individual contributors are subject to
contribution limits as well.3
Political committees4 are generally both contributors and re-
cipients of contributions. In implementing the statute, the Federal
Election Commission (FEC) has formulated regulations for the
various types of political committees that exist, including principal
3. These requirements and limits are set forth in 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-451 (1994) and 11
C.F.R. §§ 100.1-116.10 (1995).
4. The term "political committee" is defined as follows:
(A) any committee, club, association or other group of persons which receives
contributions aggregating in excess of $1,000 during a calendar year or which
makes expenditures aggregating in excess of $1,000 during a calendar year, or
(B) any separate segregated fund established under the provisions of section
441b(b) of this title; or
(C) any local committee of a political party which receives contributions aggre-
gating in excess of $5,000 during a calendar year, or makes payments exempt-
ed from the definition of contribution or expenditure as defined in paragraphs
(8) and (9) aggregating in excess of $5,000 during a calendar year, or makes
contributions aggregating in excess of $1,000 during a calendar year or makes
expenditures aggregating in excess of $1,000 during a calendar year.
2 U.S.C. § 431(4)(A)-(C) (1994).
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campaign committees,5 multi-candidate committees, 6 and party
committees The treasurer of every political committee is required
to file regular reports of receipts and disbursements made by the
committee.' The frequency of required reports varies by committee
type.9 However, all political organizations are subject to the same
reporting and disclosure requirements. Committee reports must
disclose the amount of cash held by the committee," the total
amount of all receipts, 1 and total receipts distinguished by catego-
ry.
12
The identity of persons making aggregate contributions of
more than $200 within a calendar year to any political committee
must be disclosed. 3 However, committees may disclose the identi-
ty of all contributors if the committee chooses. 4 Identification
must be accompanied by the date and amount of any contributions
reported under the statute. Individuals are to be identified by
name, mailing address, occupation, and employer.'6 Additionally,
each committee that makes a contribution 7 or transfer 8 to the
campaign in any amount must be included. Finally, a campaign is
required to disclose any person 9 who loans the campaign mon-
5. A "principal campaign committee" is defined as "a political committee designated
and authorized by a candidate." 11 C.F.R. § 100.5(e)(1) (1994).
6. A "multi-candidate committee" is a political committee that
(i) has been registered with the Commission, Clerk of the House or Secretary
of the Senate for at least 6 months;
(ii) has received contributions for Federal elections from more than 50 persons;
and
(iii) (except for any State political party organization) has made contributions to
5 or more Federal candidates.
Id. § 100.5(e)(3)(i)-(iii).
7. A "party committee" is a "political committee which represents a political party
and is part of the official party structure at the national, State, or local level." Id.
§ 100.5(e)(4).
8. 2 U.S.C. § 434(a)(1).
9. See id. § 434(a)(2)-(4), (10) (detailing the reporting requirements for congressional
campaign committees, Presidential campaign committees, Vice-Presidential campaign com-
mittees, and all political committees not authorized by a candidate).
10. Id. § 434(b)(1).
11. Id. § 434(b)(2).
12. Id. § 434(b)(2)(A)-(K).
13. 2 U.S.C. § 434(b)(3)(A) (1994).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Ld. § 434(b)(3)(A).
17. Id. § 434(b)(3)(B).
18. 2 U.S.C. § 434(b)(3)(C)-(D)(1994).
19. "Person" is defined as any "individual, partnership, committee, association, corpora-
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ey,20 as well as any person who provides a rebate, refund, off-
set,21 dividend, interest, or other receipt" with an aggregate value
of more than $200 within a calendar year.
In addition to the reporting requirements, Congress has enacted
specific limitations on contributions to candidates and political
committees. An individual may not contribute more than $1,000 to
any candidate or the authorized committee of the candidate.'
However, this is a per election limit.24 In states where a congres-
sional candidate is involved in the nominating convention, the party
primary, and the general election, the candidate may receive three
$1,000 contributions per contributor.' Individuals are limited in
the amount they may contribute each year to political committees
that are not authorized political committees of a candidate. Individ-
uals may contribute up to $20,000 annually to political committees
maintained by the national party.' Additionally, individuals are
permitted to contribute up to $5,000 annually to any other political
committee. 2' Total contributions by an individual are limited to
$25,000 per year for all categories of contributions.'
Multi-candidate political committees are also limited with
respect to the size of the contributions they may make. Such com-
mittees may not contribute more than $5,000 to a candidate in any
election.29 Like individual contributions, this is a per election lim-
it, so committees may contribute to a candidate for the state nomi-
tion, labor organization, or any other organization or group of persons, but such term
does not include the Federal Government or any authority of the Federal Government." Id.
§ 431(11).
20. Id. § 434(b)(3)(E).
21. Id. § 434(b)(3)(F).
22. Id. § 434(b)(3)(G).
23. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(A) (1994).
24. The term "election" has a very broad meaning under the code. It is defined as
(A) a general, special, primary, or runoff election;
(B) a convention or caucus of a political party which has authority to nominate
a candidate;
(C) a primary election held for the selection of delegates to a national nominat-
ing convention of a political party; and
(D) a primary election held for the expression of a preference for the nomina-
tion of individuals for election to the office of President.
Id. § 431(1)(A)-(D).
25. Id.
26. Id. § 441a(a)(1)(B).
27. Id. § 441a(a)(1)(C).
28. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(3) (1994).
29. Id. § 441a(a)(2)(A).
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nating convention, party primary, and general election. The com-
mittees are limited to annual contributions of $15,000 to national
party committees, ° and annual contributions to other political
committees of $5,000.31
Contribution limits are not modified simply because the contri-
bution is made through a conduit. The statute provides that
all contributions made by a person, either directly or indi-
rectly, on behalf of a particular candidate, including contri-
butions which are in any way earmarked or otherwise
directed through an intermediary or conduit to such candi-
date, shall be treated as contributions from such person to
such candidate. The intermediary or conduit shall report the
original source and the intended recipient of such contribu-
tion to the [Federal Election] Commission and to the in-
tended recipient.32
The statute does not address the issue of what happens when the
conduit or intermediary exercises some control over the contribu-
tion.
The FEC enacted regulations defining and implementing limits
and reporting requirements for contributions that are made under 2
U.S.C. § 441a(a)(8). The FEC defined "earmarked" as "a designa-
tion, instruction, or encumbrance, whether direct or indirect, ex-
press or implied, oral or written, which results in all or any part of
a contribution or expenditure being made to, or expended on behalf
of, a clearly identified candidate or a candidate's authorized com-
mittee."'33 The earmarking of contributions has become an impor-
tant issue as many conduits or intermediaries34 have evaded re-
porting requirements through bundling contributions.
Reporting of earmarked contributions is virtually identical to
any other contribution. The conduit or intermediary is required to
report to the FEC and the recipient candidate36 the name, mailing
30. Id. § 441a(a)(2)(B).
31. Id. § 441a(a)(2)(C).
32. Id. § 441a(a)(8).
33. 11 C.F.R. § 110.6(b)(1) (1995).
34. The FEC defines "conduit or intermediary" as "any person who receives and for-
wards an earmarked contribution to a candidate or a candidate's authorized committee,"
with some exceptions. ld. § 110.6(b)(2).
35. See infra notes 179, 220-21 and accompanying text (discussing individuals and
organizations that admittedly use bundling).
36. 11 C.F.R. § 110.6(c)(1)(i).
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address, occupation, and employer of any individual making a con-
tribution in excess of $200."7 The recipient is then required to
identify in its reports any conduit that provided one or more ear-
marked contributions that exceeded the $200 threshold, the total
amount of contributions that were made through the conduit, and
the information required to identify individuals contributing more
than $200.38
The regulations modify this structure if it is determined that
the conduit exercised any "direction or control ' 39 over the choice
of the recipient candidate. If no such control is exercised, there is
no effect on the conduit's or intermediary's contribution limits."
However, if "any" direction or control occurs over the individual's
contribution, the contribution will be counted against the limits of
both the individual and the conduit.4 ' Such contributions must be
reported to the FEC and the recipient candidate as contributions by
both the individual and the conduit with "the entire amount of the
contribution ... attributed to each."42
The interpretation of "direction and control" and the structure
of fundraising activities that results in bundling or earmarking of
campaign contributions pose significant problems for any potential
improvement in the structure of American campaign finance.
ll. THE HISTORY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REGULATION
Although some campaign contributions have been subject to
regulation since the beginning of the twentieth century,43 compre-
hensive campaign finance regulation did not emerge until the
1970s." The current system of campaign finance is a product of
37. Id. § 110.6(c)(1)(iv)(A).
38. Id. § l 10.6(c)(2)(i)-(ii).
39. 11 C.F.R. § 110.6(d)(2) (1995).
40. Id. § 110.6(d)(1). The relevant portion of the rule addressing the direct or indirect
control of a conduit states that "[a] conduit's or intermediary's contribution limits are not
affected by the forwarding of an earmarked contribution except where the conduit or
intermediary exercises any direction or control over the choice of the recipient candidate."
Id.
41. Id. § 110.6(d)(2).
42. Id.
43. See United States v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567, 570-76 (1957) (discussing the histo-
ry of American campaign finance reform).
44. See HERBERT E. ALEXANDER & MONICA BAUER, FINANCING THE 1988 ELECTION
110 (1991) (summarizing the development of campaign finance from the first Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1971 through the subsequent amendments and modifications in
1974, 1976, and 1979).
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Watergate and the 1974 amendments to the Federal Election Cam-
paign Act (FECA).45 The perception of corruption and the exis-
tence of contribution fraud led to the 1974 amendments to FECA,
which were designed to improve grass root participation in federal
elections. Congress sought to change "the shape and size of the
contributing elite"'  by increasing not only the number,47 but also
the importance of individuals making small contributions.'
Congress addressed the issue of third party conduits in FECA,
which prevented intermediaries from exercising control over the
contributions of others. 9 The House of Representatives initially
proposed this limit' and the Senate approved both the House
version of this provision and the House's legislative justification of
the special treatment of contributions through conduits.5? ' The pur-
pose of this provision, incorporated as § 441a(a)(8), is clear from
45. See David B. Magleby, Prospects for Reform, in MONEY, ELECTIONS, AND DEMOC-
RACY: REFORMING CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE 245, 256 (Margaret Latus Nugent
& John R. Johannes eds., 1990) (arguing that comprehensive reform often requires such a
deep commitment to change that a scandal may be necessary to create the perception that
change is required).
46. Ruth S. Jones, Contributing as Participation, in MONEY, ELECIONS, AND DEMOC-
RACY: REFORMING CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE 27, 39 (Margaret Latus Nugent &
John R. Johannes eds., 1990).
47. Id.
48. FRANK J. SORAUF, INSIDE CAMPAIGN FINANCE: MYTHS AND REALrrIES 239 (1992)
(asserting that Congress attempted to develop a system of campaign finance where individ-
uals without a financial interest in a candidate and with limited resources would become
the primary source of campaign contributions).
An inference can be drawn from the reporting provisions that small contributions are
not seen as corrupting as larger ones. Because Congress exempted from identification
contributors who donate less than $200 to a candidate for Federal office, it is much easier
administratively for campaigns to solicit such contributions. See 2 U.S.C. § 434(b)(3)(A)
(1994).
49. Id. § 441a(a)(8) (1994); see also supra text accompanying note 32 (quoting the
statute text).
50. The House Report states that
if a person exercises any direct or indirect control over the making of a contri-
bution, then such contribution shall count toward the limitation imposed with
respect to such person . . . but it will not count toward such a person's contri-
bution limitation when it is demonstrated that such person exercised no direct
or indirect control over the making of the contribution involved.
H.R. REP. No. 93-1239, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1974), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTo-
RY OF FEDERAL ELECTON CAMAIGN ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1974, at 650 (1977).
51. H.R. REP. No. 93-1438, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 51-52 (1974), reprinted in LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1974, at 995
(1977) (citing the portion of the House report regarding regulation of conduits and inter-
mediaries).
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its language and the legislative history;52 Congress intended for
the FEC to regulate contributions controlled by an intermediary
other than the candidate or the individual.
A. Buckley v. Valeo: The Court and Campaign Finance Law
The 1974 amendments to FECA were significantly modified
by the ruling of the Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo.53 The
Court held that campaign finance regulations were justified when
necessary to stem corruption or the appearance of corruption. 4
The Court was particularly concerned with the exchange of contri-
butions for political favor." As a result, the Court upheld limits
on contributions to candidates but rejected limits on expenditures
by candidates. 6
The ruling by the Court in Buckley fundamentally changed the
campaign finance regime established by the 1974 Amendments.
The emphasis placed on contribution limits did not increase the
importance of small donors to campaigns. Instead, it created a
system consisting of two classes of contributions-PAC contribu-
tions and individual contributions. Because PACs had higher con-
tribution limits than individuals, PACs became the most desirable
contributions to pursue.57 Holding limits on expenditures unconsti-
tutional, the Court inadvertently "spawned a money chase that re-
quires constant fundraising and continued reliance on wealthy do-
nors."58 Evidence shows that small contributions have declined
significantly in importance since the Court's decision in 1976."
52. Id.
53. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
54. Id. at 26.
55. See id. The Court implemented a view of corruption that separated political contri-
butions from political expenditures. As a result, "the Court established a dichotomy that
has since governed campaign-finance regulation . . . . [The Court understood the corrup-
tion risk solely in terms of the threat of quid pro quo corruption-dollars given in return
for political favors. Large contributions heightened this risk while unrestrained expenditures
did not." Kenneth J. Levit, Campaign Finance Reform and the Return of Buckley v.
Valeo, 103 YALE LJ. 469, 473 (1993) (footnote omitted). Levit notes that this distinction
and formulation of corruption has been heavily criticized. Id. at 473 n.21.
56. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 58-59.
57. See Levit, supra note 55, at 472-75 (arguing that the result of Buckley was the
opposite of what the Court had intended).
58. Id. at 473.
59. See LARRY J. SABATO, PAYING FOR ELECTIONS 61 (1989) (noting that between
1978 and 1984 the percentage of individual gifts of less than $100 as a percentage of
total campaign contributions has declined from 38% to 20%); see also infra note 154
(showing that a very small percentage of the population provided approximately three-
[Vol. 46:531
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Additionally, total contributions by individuals have become less
important sources of campaign contributions since Buckley.6° The
decline in the importance of individual contributors coincides with
a period in which the political parties have neither the mass popu-
larity nor the organizational ability to rally individual supporters.6 '
Many groups have filled the vacuum created by Buckley in the
form of political action committees (PACs), single issue political
interest organizations, and wealthy individuals who act as brokers.
Although PACs existed prior to the 1974 amendments to FECA,
the Act, as modified by Buckley, "ushered in a greatly enlarged
PAC role., 62 Additionally, loopholes in campaign finance laws
appear to have been increasingly utilized by individuals, parties,
and single issue political interest organizations during the last de-
cade.63
The importance of large contributions has resulted in a Con-
gress captive to the post-Buckley system. Commentators argue that,
after Buckley, congressional attempts to resolve campaign finance
problems with additional reforms have failed because of partisan
conflict.' The campaign finance laws have been utilized and ma-
nipulated by both parties in their attempts either to gain power
from or to maintain power over the other.65
quarters of the total amount of individual contributions for 1992 federal campaigns).
60. See SABATO, supra note 59, at 83 n.2 (stating that, as a proportion of money
raised, individual contributions declined form 61% in 1978 to only 49% in 1984-four
percentage points in each election cycle).
61. See SORAUF, supra note 48, at 241 (arguing that even though parties have the
ability to raise significant amounts of money, today they cannot assume the role that they
played in the early twentieth century because they lack the popular support they once
had).
62. Stephen E. Gottlieb, The Dilemma of Election Campaign Finance Reform, 18
HoFSTRA L. REv. 213, 219 n.33 (1989).
63. See Anne H. Bedlington, Loopholes and Abuses, in MONEY, ELEcnoNs, AND DE-
MOCRACY: REFORMING CoNGREssIoNAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE 69, 69 (Margaret Latus
Nugent & John R. Johannes eds., 1990) (arguing that, even though the evidence is incom-
plete and somewhat anecdotal, during the 1980s there was a gradual increase in abusive
behavior with a sudden increase in the use of loopholes among wealthy individuals and
large political interests).
64. See, e.g., ALEXANDER & BAUER, supra note 44, at 135 (arguing that the greatest
impediment to campaign reform is Congress itself).
65. Id. at 135-38 (discussing congressional bad faith maneuvers between 1987 and
1990). Alexander and Bauer write,
Campaign finance is a politician's issue ... [and] it is the lifeblood of most
members of Congress .... [M]embers have come to view election reform
attempts as partisan maneuvers designed to exploit their party's strengths and
their rivals' weaknesses. ... For rather than make the public interest the guid-
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B. Conduits and Intermediaries After Buckley
In Buckley, the Court foresaw the potential use of intermediar-
ies or conduits to circumvent the limits of FECA. In a footnote,
the Court wrote that although the Act limits "the ability of all
individuals and groups to contribute large amounts of money to
candidates, the Act's contribution ceilings do not foreclose the
making of substantial contributions to candidates by some major
special-interest groups through the combined effect of individual
contributions from adherents."'  The original language of the stat-
ute, which prevented control "either directly or indirectly," was
incorporated into the regulations.67 If any "direction or control" is
exercised by an intermediary or a conduit, then the regulation
states that the "contribution shall be considered a contribution by
both the original contributor and the conduit or intermediary."'
The FEC has liberalized the regulation in its Advisory Opin-
ions interpreting the "direction or control" exercised by third par-
ties. Prior to 1980, the Commission sought to restrict the influence
of intermediaries or conduits. Initially, the FEC found control to
exist when conduits requested that donors "earmark" contributions
previously made69 or a separate segregated fund (SSF) recom-
mended or solicited a contribution from the private account of a
participant in the fund.70 This position was modified in 1980,
ing light behind reform legislation . .. legislative strategists chose instead to
immunize their proposals from adoption by potential allies across the aisle.
Id. at 135-36.
66. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 29 n.31.
67. See supra text accompanying notes 39-42 (discussing the regulation).
68. 11 C.F.R. § 110.6(d)(2) (1995).
69. Internal Transfers of Funds by Candidates or Committees (AO 1975-10), 1 Fed.
Election Camp. Fin. Guide (CCH) 5116 (Aug. 21, 1975) [hereinafter AO 1975-10]. The
FEC ruled that such a request by a conduit constituted "some control." Id.
70. Employee Group as Political Committee (RE: AOR 1976-92), 2 Fed. Election
Camp. Fin. Guide (CCH) 6951 (Nov. 10, 1976) [hereinafter AOR 1976-92]. The Com-
mission held that Boeing's SSF would be exercising direction or control over private
contributions from the campaign accounts under individual control of an employee if it
solicited or recommended a particular candidate. Id. This opinion does not constitute a
true Advisory Opinion however. It was provided in response to a request by Boeing
Company's Civic Pledge Program based on proposed regulations. Id. Although the FEC
applied the proposed language of 11 C.F.R. § 110.6, such application is improper. Ear-
marking limits were not intended to apply to contributions made by SSFs because in the
1974 Amendments the House of Representatives intended to prevent SSFs from acting as
conduits for earmarked contributions. See H.R. REP. No. 1239, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 15
(1974). This language was incorporated into the Conference Report and represented the
position of both Houses. H.R. REP. No. 1438, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1974).
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when the FEC concluded that the recommendation of a contribution
to a specific candidate does not constitute "direction or control" if
sent initially to the soliciting conduit.7' The Commission's ratio-
nale was that the individual controlled whether a contribution was
made and the amount contributed.72 In spite of this definition, the
FEC has reiterated in subsequent Advisory Opinions that "any
direction or control" will result in double counting.'
In 1986, the FEC recommended coordinating the language of
the regulation with the original statute, replacing "direction or
control" with the language contained in the earlier committee re-
ports prohibiting "any direct or indirect control" over contributions
by conduits.74 In its discussion of the proposed rule change, the
Commission admitted that "[c]urrently, § 110.6(d) does not provide
criteria for determining whether a conduit exercised 'direction and
control' or 'direct or indirect control' over an earmarked contribu-
tion."'75 Although the FEC implemented several other proposed
rules, § 110.6(d) was not modified.
The lack of clarity in the meaning of the regulation became a
significant issue as earmarking and bundling became more impor-
tant in the late 1980s.76 The lack of a concrete definition of what
acts constituted "direction or control" frustrated consistent applica-
tion of the regulation.' In fact, today the "direction or control"
71. Soliciting Contributions to Be Forwarded to Candidate (AO 1980-46), 1 Fed. Elec-
tion Camp. Fin. Guide (CCI) f 5508 (June 25, 1980). Responding to a request by the
National Conservative Political Action Committee (NCPAC), the FEC concluded that con-
tributions resulting from communications containing "a clear suggestion that the individu-
al[s] receiving the communication[s] make a contribution to a specific candidate through
NCPAC as an intermediary ... would not be considered contributions by NCPAC ....
Such contributions would only count against the contribution limitations of those persons
making their contributions through NCPAC as an intermediary." Id.
72. Id.
73. See, e.g., Transfer of Contributions from State PAC to Federal PAC (AO 1981-21),
1 Fed. Election Camp. Fin. Guide (CCH) 9 5611 (June 4, 1981) (stating, however, that it
did not reach the issue of whether the particular PAC exercised any direction or control
over the choice of the recipient candidate). Double counting occurs when both the con-
tributor and the PAC are required to count the individual's contribution against their limits
due to the improper influence of the PAC over the contribution. See supra notes 39-42
and accompanying text.
74. Comments Sought on Contribution Limitations, [Transfer Binder] Fed. Election
Camp. Fin. Guide (CCH) 9236, at 51,823 (July 23, 1986).
75. Id.
76. Bedlington, supra note 63, at 79-80.
77. In a concurring opinion to FEC AO 1991-29, Commissioner Thomas J. Josefiak
attacked the Commission's inability and refusal to define the parameters for its consider-
ation. He stated,
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clause is now meaningless in the wake of the decision of the Court
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in Federal Election Commission v.
National Republican Senatorial Committee."
In 1986, the National Republican Senatorial Committee
(NRSC) pre-selected candidates for whom it would solicit contribu-
tions.79 It sent out letters requesting contributions, which would be
divided equally among four unnamed candidates identified only by
their state of residence." The FEC originally refused to take ac-
tion against the NRSC, so Common Cause sued, winning a judg-
ment that compelled agency action."' The Commission then
brought an enforcement action against the NRSC. The Court of
Appeals ruled for the NRSC, stating that "[t]o find direction or
control on these facts would require a substantial shift in the
Commission's construction of the language contained in
§ 110.6(d)." 2 Thus, the FEC's and the courts' inconsistent appli-
cation of the "direction or control" clause gives the clause virtually
no effect.
IV. THE FAmURE OF COMPREHENSIVE REFORM
Effective campaign reform requires measures that do not seek
partisan advantage. To accomplish this, Congress should abandon
attempts at comprehensive reform and adopt an incremental ap-
proach. Incremental reform is appropriate when specific action is a
necessary precursor to successful comprehensive reform. By ad-
dressing the practice of bundling and earmarking first, more ag-
gressive reform can be undertaken without fear of circumvention of
It is long overdue for the FEC culture to shed its instinctive aversion to ordi-
nary political fundraising. It is time to face up to describing a specific meaning
for the "direction or control" standard under the earmarking regulations, instead
of treating it as a chance to circumscribe PAC activity. Rather than constantly
reneging on the principle that "recommendation is not necessarily direction" in
every case, the Commission should set out some relatively specific limits and
guides for soliciting earmarked contributions under the "direction or control"
standard of 11 CFR 110.6(d). The Commission missed a good opportunity to
begin in Advisory Opinion 1991-29.
Collection of Contributions by PAC and Subsequent Earmarking (AO 1991-29), 2 Fed.
Election Camp. Fin. Guide (CCH) I 6036 (Dec. 4, 1991).
78. 966 F.2d 1471 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
79. Id. at 1473.
80. Id.
81. Common Cause v. Federal Election Comm'n, 729 F. Supp. 148, 152 (D.D.C. 1990)
(holding that the FEC's partial dismissal of the complaint was arbitrary and capricious).
82. National Republican Senatorial Comm., 966 F.2d at 1478.
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later campaign regulations.
A. Comprehensive Reform of Campaign Finance Laws Is Doomed
To understand why an incremental approach is called for, it is
necessary to first discuss the general flaws that exist in comprehen-
sive reform proposals. Congressional attempts at a campaign fi-
nance overhaul have failed and will continue to fail because effec-
tive reform requires a fundamental motivation for change.3 Sever-
al characteristics exist that destine any comprehensive reform to
failure.
First, comprehensive reform generally has been neither well
developed nor truly long-term. Participants in the electoral process
thrive on finding ways around the law. Any new :regulation imme-
diately comes under attack by interested parties."4 Political actors
tend to think and operate in the short term, seeking to maximize
any political advantage they may have." By focusing on immedi-
ate benefits and quick resolutions to problems, legislators fail to
anticipate the adaptations to new rules.86 This is evidenced by the
development of "[b]undling, soft money, personal PACs, and the
political use of tax-exempt foundations"' to circumvent the cur-
rent campaign laws. Effective campaign reform must not only pre-
empt circumvention by political interests, but also survive judicial
challenge. After Buckley, Congress has adapted to such'3outcomes
by relying on contingency plans 9 or severability clauses.' Thus,
83. Magleby, supra note 45, at 256 ("It is typically easier to build a legislative ma-
jority to change a few things than to revamp the entire system. Comprehensive reform
requires a deeper commitment to change and a perception that something is seriously
wrong").
84. See John R. Johannes & Margaret Latus Nugent, Conclusion: Reforms and Values,
in MONEY, ELECHONS, AND DEMOCRACY: REFORMIG CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN FI-
NANCE 263, 267 (John R. Johannes & Margaret Latus Nugent eds., 1990) (arguing that
actors with a stake in reform will act to undermine any reform for their own benefit).
85. Bedlington, supra note 63, at 87 (noting that parties involved in campaign finance
favor short-term tactical advantages regardless of the damage that such behavior may
cause to the system in general).
86. See Magleby, supra note 45, at 248 (discussing the need to forecast potential nega-
tive adaptations to proposed reforms).
87. Id. at 248 (citing these as examples of the evolution that has occurred in campaign
contributions as political actors adapted to the limits placed on them by the FECA).
88. Id (noting that the judiciary often modifies part of an Act, resulting in distortion
of the effects of the unmodified parts of the Act).
89. For example, the Senate's bill in the 103d Congress banned PAC contributions but
contained language that would limit PACs to $1,000 in contributions per election cycle,
per candidate if the ban was not upheld by the courts. Raising Money: Midyear Disclo-
sure Reports Paint a Cloudy Future for Campaign Finance Reform Bills, POL. FIN. &
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attempts at comprehensive reform fail because they do not address
political and judicial pressures that are foreseeable at the time of
enactment.
Next, comprehensive reform has proven to be a theoretical
derelict due to the absence of clear and legitimate goals. Congress
has not acted within a legitimate analytical framework in formulat-
ing campaign finance reforms. Action is driven by the desire to
avoid future scandal9 and self-preservation,' not by a desire to
promote the accomplishment of specific altruistic goals." This
failure is not solely the fault of Congress. "Bad" reform and a lack
of reform are also caused by the intransigent attitudes of public
interest lobbyists-for example, Common Cause or Ralph
Nader--demanding reforms.94 It is impossible to develop support
for campaign finance reform without compromise among interested
parties. An "all or nothing" attitude undermines reform. The
original goal of FECA, to increase grass-roots participation,'
failed to provide a strong theoretical base for reform after the
LOBBY REP., Aug. 26, 1994, at 1.
90. See Magleby, supra note 45, at 248.
91. See id. at 256 (stating that comprehensive reform is motivated by "a perception
that something is seriously wrong" and "[s]candal has most often created this perception").
92. ALEXANDER & BAUER, supra note 44, at 109 (pointing out that the self-preserva-
tion instinct of politicians has led them to formulate laws that favor themselves).
93. See SORAUF, supra note 48, at 230 (noting that congressional action in the area of
campaign finance has proven barren of goals or theoretical justification to enable it to be
truly forward-looking and motivated by something other than "short-term projections based
on recent personal experience").
94. See ALEXANDER & BAUER, supra note 44, at 138 (The "failure can be laid at the
feet of the public interest lobby and editorial writers . . . who echoed the reformers ...
Their 'all or nothing' stance . . . prevented any incremental improvements. . . .). These
groups reject any reform that does not follow their organizational reforms. See Curtis
Gans, Alive Again in Washington, WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 1994, at A23 (noting that the
bills emerging from the 103d Congress had no support other than "a handful of interest
groups and journalists"). Additionally, those public interest lobbies that advocate the use
of public financing in the name of greater equity are misled because the proposals offered
would likely further alienate the public from true electoral participation as they would lose
even the minimal financial tie that they have to candidates to whom they contribute. See
David S. Broder, Pox Populi; Why the New "Reform" Really Serves the Elites, WASH.
POST, Apr. 25, 1993, at C1 (arguing that the proposals offered by Common Cause and
the League of Women Voters would likely increase the power of the social and economic
elite that advocate them while likely decreasing the influence of the general public); see
also Mickey Edwards, Money-Still the Mother's Milk of Politics, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8,
1994, at A22 (noting that the professional reformers seek to remove individual influence
from campaigns, which the author argues is the essence of democracy).
95. See ALEXANDER & BAUER, supra note 44, at 138.
96. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
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Supreme Court's decision in Buckley.'
Although the current campaign system is administered by laws
designed to promote a grass-roots model of participation, the
changes occurring due to Buckley have ironically fostered the
growth of large institutional contributors.98 Power due to incum-
bency and the ability to raise money have transformed the role of
the voters from the electors of candidates to ratifiers of the status
quo.9 The decline in importance of the voter and the perceived
corresponding increase in importance of money has led to voter
disinterest and abandonment of the process."o Change in the fi-
nancing of federal elections is a prerequisite to increased voter
interest. Unless all political interests modify their behavior and
subscribe to reform, it is unlikely that voter detachment will re-
verse." Reform must truly have the goal of increasing individual
participation. Most reform proposals have been highly partisan
efforts motivated by a desire to distract the public while allowing
advocates to benefit from the perception that they are attempting
reform."c2 Unless reform fundamentally changes campaigns, it is
97. See supra notes 53-63 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of the Su-
preme Court holding in Buckley invalidating statutory limits on campaign expenditures
while upholding limits on campaign contributions). Justice White argues that the Supreme
Court has destroyed campaign regulation in its various decisions on the matter. Federal
Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 518
(1985) (White, J., dissenting). He states that "[bly striking down one portion of an inte-
grated and comprehensive statute, the Court has once again transformed a coherent regula-
tory scheme into a nonsensical, loophole-ridden patchwork." Id.
98. See SORAUF, supra note 48, at 241 (noting that organized giving dominates the
current system of campaign finance).
99. See id. at 233-34 (arguing that voter choices are reduced due to the increasing
power associated with the benefits of incumbency that accrue to members of Congress in
federal elections).
100. Levit, supra note 55, at 495.
101. RuY A. TEIXERA, THE DISAPPEARNG AMERICAN VOTER 155 (1992) (asserting that
due to three decades of decline in voter participation, it is unlikely that Americans can be
reconnected to the political system absent significant changes in the way that political
interests contest elections). The decline in voter turnout and participation has occurred
while party affiliation of the electorate eroded. See Broder, supra note 94, at C1 (noting
that the decline in partisanship coincides with a decline in voter participation). "Libera-
tion" from the parties may have resulted in the lack of attachment that voters feel to the
process. Id. Many of the current proposals for comprehensive reform fail to effectively
address the importance of voter identification and attachment to the system. Reforms that
decrease the importance of individual contributors are likely to result in greater voter
detachment from the process and the parties. See Edwards, supra note 94, at A22 (argu-
ing that although reform is needed, the proposals that call for even less direct financial
participation by individuals will limit public participation and debate, resulting in domina-
tion of government and elections by the elite).
102. See ALEXANDER & BAUER, supra note 44, at 135-36. The most recent attempts at
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not likely that individual participation will increase.0 3
In sum, the failure of reform is due to the lack of foresight of
Congress, the lack of clear and legitimate goals to direct reform
efforts, and the inability of reforms currently proposed to increase
voter participation.
B. Congress Has Failed in Its Attempts at Comprehensive
Reform
The motivations for reform differ between the two major
political parties and between the houses of Congress." In spite
of being members of the same party, members of the House of
Representatives and the Senate have different political interests due
to the institutional differences between the bodies. 5 Four distinct
congressional groups exist, each with distinct goals: House Demo-
crats, House Republicans, Senate Democrats, and Senate Republi-
cans."° As a result, any partisan reform proposal is not only un-
palatable to the other party but also the members of the other
chamber.
The treatment of proposals for campaign reform in the House
during the year 1989 illustrates partisan barriers to reform." Af-
reforming campaign finance were not popularly supported. Gans, supra note 94, at A23.
Even though congressional leadership attempted to show wide support by the public and
may have succeeded in molding public opinion, in reality, only a few interest groups and
journalists supported the proposals of the 103d Congress. Id.
103. See TEXEIRA, supra note 101, at 163-64 (noting that greater electoral competitive-
ness increases the importance of the role of the average citizen).
104. See Magleby, supra note 45, at 254-55 (noting that, traditionally, Senate Democrats
tend to be the group most in favor of reform and the House Democrats least supportive
of true reform). The fundamental change that has occurred in congressional politics, due
to the 1994 Republican victory, renders much of this analysis meaningless if utilized pro-
spectively to project what is likely to happen in the arena of campaign finance. The
partisan conflict that has existed in Congress may be transformed if the Republicans can
maintain a more cohesive ideological base in both houses of Congress than the Democrats
did. The ability of the Republicans to bring conservative Democrats into their tent may
overcome the partisan problems that have plagued past Congresses.
105. See ALEXANDER & BAUER, supra note 44, at 136-38 (discussing the failure of
reform in 1990).
106. Magleby argues that three barriers to comprehensive reform differentiate the House
Democrats, House Republicans, Senate Democrats, and Senate Republicans: self-interest,
philosophy, and personality. Magleby, supra note 45, at 250-55. In the past, the House
Democrats had the most to lose by any reform, while the Senate Democrats had the least
to lose; the Republicans in both houses were somewhere in between. Id. Although this
analysis must be viewed differently with Republican majorities in both houses, the true
barriers are probably a reflection of structural factors and not partisan ones.
107. The resignations of Speaker Jim Wright and Congressman Tony Coelho marked the
demise of two of the Democratic party's strongest members and fundraisers. See Magleby,
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ter several failed attempts at campaign finance reform, the House
attempted a bi-partisan approach to campaign finance reform,
which, unfortunately, ended quickly."8  The members of the
House task force were unable to overcome "legitimate partisan
differences"'" on the issues important to each.
This period may have been the high point of campaign fi-
nance reform in the House. Subsequent attempts at campaign re-
form became even more partisan than previous proposals."0 Bills
presented by each party protected the strengths and interests of the
offeror."' Thus, the parties benefited by doing nothing while suc-
ceeding in maintaining the issue before the public, appearing aware
of its own institutional shortcomings without modifying its position
or compromising."2
Although the Senate is traditionally less partisan than the
House,"13 its attempts at comprehensive reform have failed as
well. In 1988, Senators attempted to resolve partisan differences
through negotiations conducted by four members of each party."4
supra note 45, at 252-53. Some speculated that they were the principle impediments to
campaign finance reform due to their highly partisan conduct. Id. The failed 1989 biparti-
san House task force on campaign finance may be evidence of that fact. SORAUF, supra
note 48, at 195. For a comprehensive look at the power that Tony Coelho exercised as
head of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, see BROOKS JACKSON, HoN-
EST GRA~r (1988), which details the activities of Coelho during the 1986 election cycle
as he raised money and conducted the party's congressional campaign.
108. SORAUF, supra note 48, at 195 (noting that the task force appointed by the leaders
of both parties agreed to ban leadership PACs and place tighter controls on bundling).
109. Id. (quoting Representative Al Swift, the Democratic co-chair of the bipartisan task
force).
110. ALEXANDER & BAUER, supra note 44, at 126 ("[Mlembers had largely ignored the
issue of campaign finance since their own failure at bipartisanship in the fall of
1989. . . . [A]ction there was characterized by far less ambitious reform and a more
determined pursuit of partisan interest.").
111. House Republicans tended to offer reform proposals that diminish the power of
PACs, which tend to contribute in greater amounts to Democrats. See Magleby, supra
note 45, at 251-52. The Democrats tried to limit the amounts that campaigns can spend,
which makes it more difficult to defeat incumbents who were generally Democrats. Id.
112. See ALEXANDER & BAUER, supra note 44, at 135 (noting that congressional action
in the area "might all be considered a waste of time were it not for the public relations
value and political mileage that Congress was ultimately able to wring from the issue");
see also Campaign Reform Is Vital, Ci. SUN-TIMEs, Jan. 22, 1995, at 31 (stating that
attempts at campaign reform "have been politicized, insincere, ineffective and, for a
change, bipartisan: Democrats and Republicans both have scuttled previous reform at-
tempts").
113. See Magleby, supra note 45, at 249 (arguing that the greater partisan balance and
more competitive elections in the Senate may be the reason for greater cooperation be-
tween parties in the Senate).
114. ALEXANDER & BAUER, supra note 44, at 114.
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However, they failed to overcome the partisan obstacles that had
prevented resolution in the House: namely, spending limits.15
Rather than forsake campaign reform, in 1990, the Senate looked
beyond its chamber to a bipartisan committee of experts for assis-
tance. 6 However, party conflict quickly led to modification of
the experts' proposals."7 Institutional conflict between Senate and
House Democrats prevented any further reform."'
Even though the Clinton administration initially claimed that
campaign reform was a priority of the administration,"9 the Presi-
dent and the Congress failed to agree on reform and thus failed to
effect any reform during the 103d Congress. Although the Demo-
crats of the House and Senate agreed about the need for campaign
finance reform, they quickly diverged in their approaches to re-
form. The Senate took an aggressive approach to PACs, banning
them completely.2 It initially prohibited any use of conduits, but
as time passed, the Senate appeared willing to adopt the House's
provision to facilitate compromise.'
The Senate has been the source of bi-partisan reform propos-
als, but its failure to produce reform is evidence of the struc-
tural bias against reform. The Senate's proposal, Senate Bill 3
(S. 3), in the 103d Congress"z to eliminate PACs and ban bun-
dling proved unacceptable to the House and thus unpassable. 24
115. Id. (quoting Senator Mitch McConnell as stating that "[i]t was the spending limits
that broke down the process").
116. SoRAJF, supra note 48, at 195. The "Gang of Six" produced a proposal that
sought to balance the interests of both parties. Id. at 195-96. Its report offered a moderate
approach to reform that proved unpalatable to either party. Id. Among the proposals of
the committee, (1) an increase in the individual contribution limit, subsequently indexed
for inflation, (2) voluntary expenditure limits that offered challengers realistic opportunities
for election, (3) incentives to abide by the limits by offering reduced rates for advertising,
postage, and tax-credits to in-state contributors, and (4) a ban on bundling by corporate
and union PACs as well as lobbyists. ALExAND R & BAUER, supra note 44, at 119-20.
117. ALEXANDER & BAlER, supra note 44, at 123 (noting that "Departures from the
panel blueprint . . . began almost immediately").
118. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
119. See Tim Curran, Leaders to Name Election Reform Conferees, ROLL CALL, Apr.
18, 1994, at 3 (stating that "President Clinton is almost certain to sign any bill that pass-
es Congress").
120. Id.
121. Id. (quoting a House aide who stated that the Senate had "been more accommodat-
ing" on exempting one conduit from the proposed bundling prohibition).
122. See supra notes 113-18 and accompanying text.
123. S. 3, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 401 (1993) [hereinafter S. 3].
124. See James A. Barnes, Endgame for Campaign Reform, NAT'L J., Apr. 23, 1994, at
969 (noting that although the Senate was willing to modify its bundling ban to appease
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The Senate's ban on bundling failed to address a potential
loophole with significant potential for future abuse. The law cur-
rently allows candidates to use commercial fundraiser proceeds
retained by a candidate in campaigns."'z The Senate's bill would
not have changed the treatment of commercial fundraisers.'26 It is
not improbable that a candidate could nominally hire the executive
director of a political interest organization to bundle contributions
in the role of a paid consultant. Although there is nothing inherent-
ly wrong with the hiring of professional fundraisers, some modifi-
cation of the law would have been necessary to prevent such an
abuse.
The Senate's proposal also ignored potential abuses of
brokering. Brokering occurs when an individual representing a
significant political or personal interest arranges for wealthy and
influential contributors to gather for a political event to benefit a
candidate. 2  Senate candidates have traditionally relied on
brokering to raise large contributions outside of the candidate's
state. "  Although this requires much more effort and time by
both the candidate and the broker than simple bundling, it is more
lucrative because these contributors make much larger contributions
than do those who participate in bundling efforts. 29 S. 3 would
supporters of one conduit, EMILY's List, the unwillingness of the House to accept any-
thing less than the current levels of PAC support would prevent House and Senate recon-
ciliation of their bills, and would likely cause the Senate Democrats to lose the support
of moderate Senate Republicans).
125. 11 C.F.R. § 110.6(b)(2)(i)(D) (1995) (excluding any "commercial fundraising firm
retained by the candidate or the candidate's authorized committee to assist in fundraising"
from the definition of conduit). The FEC has stated that "commercial fundraising firms
retained by a candidate are not conduits, even if they receive and forward contributions."
Corporation as Contribution Broker (AO 1991-32), 2 Fed. Election Camp. Fin. Guide
(CCH) 6048 n.9 (Mar. 13, 1992).
126. See S. 3, supra note 123, § 401.
127. SOtAUF, supra note 48, at 54 (In describing the typical brokered event, "[a] lead-
ing industrialist or environmentalist or feminist, or whoever, organizes the occasion, invites
the 'guests,' provides the locale and refreshments, and discreetly suggests the size of the
contribution.").
128. Id.
129. Id. (noting that brokering is a relatively easy and quick way to obtain a large
number of $1,000 individual contributions). But see Rick Pluta, Finance Bill Spells Trou-
ble for EMILY's, HOUSTON CriRON., Nov. 1, 1993, at 1 (noting that EMILY's List claims
raising over $6 million for candidates with average contributions of $93). Such fundraising
is appealing to many candidates as they are able to obtain, through the broker's contacts,
the support of influential donors the candidate would have otherwise been unable to ob-
tain as well as additional media attention. Media personalities are often party to such
events. Glen R. Simpson, ROLL CALL, Jan. 18, 1993, available in LEXIS, Cmpgn Library,
Allnws File (discussing a study conducted as to the contribution patterns of influential
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not have curtailed such brokering because it exempted an individu-
al "hosting a fundraising event" at the individual's home from the
definition of a "intermediary or conduit.' 131 Thus, brokers would
either host such events in their own homes or organize the event
for another individual who could act as the intermediary.
In spite of the Senate's claim, the Senate bill did not ban
PACs, but only their contributions to federal candidates.' 3' Under
the new regime they could still make independent expenditures on
behalf of a candidate, or raise funds for a candidate's benefit that
can be routed through national, state, or local party committees.'
Additional means of circumventing the law would likely be devel-
oped by the PACs that could be more insidious than current prac-
tices and actually result in greater problems than currently ex-
ist. 3 The Senate's implicit acknowledgment of the unconstitu-
tionality of the ban on PAC contributions 34 calls into question its
motive for reform: true change, or acquisition of political capital.
The House's attempt at reform, House Bill 3 (H.R. 3),35
was even more deficient than the Senate bill. The House passed a
bill that would have limited total PAC contributions and established
voluntary spending limits for candidates. 36 Although it limited
Hollywood figures); The Briar Patch, ROLL CALL, Feb. 15, 1993, available in LEXIS,
Cmpgn Library, Allnws File (noting the contributions of a number of movie industry
executives on a single day in 1991 to former Oklahoma Congressman Mike Synar). Addi-
tionally, some PACs even recruit entertainers to appear at fundraisers with congressional
candidates. Margaret A. Latus, Assessing Ideological PACs: From Outrage to Under-
standing, in MONEY AND POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES: FINANCING ELECTIONS IN THE
1980S 142, 160 (Michael J. Malbin ed., 1984) (noting the tendency of the National Com-
mittee for an Effective Congress PAC to recruit entertainers).
130. See S. 3, supra note 123, § 401.
131. The Big Stall: It's Mid-year and Reformers Are Starting to Get Nervous as the
Clock Runs on Campaign Finance Bill, POL. FIN. & LOBBY REP., June 22, 1994, at 1, 2
[hereinafter The Big Stall].
132. SORAuF, supra note 48, at 214.
133. Id. Sorauf foresees the possibility that PACs could actually begin to legally run the
campaigns of candidates within the law as it currently exists or, worse, make large contri-
butions to potential candidates prior to becoming official candidates to avoid contribution
limits. Id. The loopholes retained under S. 3 would allow the institutionalization of PAC
bundling in the campaigns of federal candidates and could result in the potential problems
predicted by Sorauf.
134. See Magleby, supra note 45, at 248.
135. H.R. 3, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. § 501 (1993).
136. Id.; see also The Big Stall, supra note 131. In a speech on the House floor
describing and extolling the virtues of H.R. 3, Representative Gejdenson, the sponsor of
the bill, noted,
Section 501 amends section 315 of FECA to prohibit any person from acting
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the extent to which some bundling could occur, the House exempt-
ed political committees that did not lobby from any bundling regu-
lation. '37 That exemption was directed at preserving the ability of
EMILY's List to raise money for Democrats."' Although the
House claimed to limit bundling, the exemption to protect
EMILY's List would have produced a new loophole that could
have conceivably allowed all PACs to reorganize themselves to
circumvent the bundling ban. Proponents claimed that organizations
that did not lobby,'39 but only supported candidates, posed no
threat to the electoral process."
as a conduit or intermediary for contributions to a candidate. "Conduit or inter-
mediary" is defined as collecting and physically transmitting checks to a candi-
date, except that a "representative" of a candidate, defined as commercial
fundraisers, volunteers holding house parties, and individuals who forward their
spouses' contributions, and other individuals authorized and not acting on behalf
of any prohibited class are not considered conduits or intermediaries. Represen-
tatives of a candidate may not include individuals acting on behalf of political
committees with a connected organization, political parties, partnerships, sole
proprietorships, or any organization which is prohibited from contributing to a
candidate under the Federal Election Campaign Act, including corporations,
labor unions, national banks, and trade associations.
139 CONG. REC. H10657 (daily ed. Nov. 22, 1993).
The impact of § 501 of H.R. 3 was noted in the floor debate prior to its
passage. Representative Brown of Florida stated that "[i]t also prohibits bundling while
allowing groups such as Emily's List to continue to assist women candidates for office."
139 CONG. REc. H10605 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 1993). The essential difference between the
bundling reform proposed by the Senate and that offered by the House is in their treat-
ment of political committees. The House only prohibited bundling by political committees
with a connected organization, H.R. 3, supra note 135, § 501, while the Senate prohibited
bundling by all political committees, not just those that had a connected organization. S.
3, supra note 123, § 401. The result of the House measure would have been to preserve
a significant loophole for the continuance of bundling.
137. See Barnes, supra note 124, at 969 (discussing the attempt to resolve differences
between House and Senate bills).
138. Id.; Richard E. Cohen, For Heavy Lifting, They Call Gephardt, NAT'L J., May 15,
1993, 1191 ("[Mlany of the 35 Democratic women Members insisted on an exemption
from proposed restrictions on political action committees to permit EMILY's List, a lead-
ing PAC for Democratic women, to continue 'bundling' contributions.").
139. EMILY's List sought an exemption for PACs that were not connected to a busi-
ness, trade, or labor organization from limitations on bundling. The connected versus non-
connected distinction has been justified on the grounds that non-connected PACs do not
lobby members of Congress but instead promote only an electoral agenda and not a legis-
lative one. See infra notes 226-41 and accompanying text (discussing the flaws in the
lobbying versus non-lobbying distinction).
140. See All Things Considered (NPR radio broadcast, Apr. 8, 1993), available in
LEXIS, Cmpgn Library, Alnws File. Ellen Malcolm of EMILY's List, supporting the
exemption supported in Congress for her organization, distinguished it from a traditional
PAC as follows: "I think the difference is that we support pro-choice Democratic women
running in elections, but when the election's over, we don't get in a cab and run up to
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H.R. 3 failed as legitimate reform due to its protectionist na-
ture. First, the House proposal reinforced campaign finance as a
means of exploiting the relative strengths of the majority and
weaknesses of the minority parties. 41 Second, the groups that
would have been protected tend to promote a single issue or limit-
ed issue base.42 The plethora of groups advocating single issues
or interests from all parts of the political spectrum may undermine
the electoral process by making campaigns focus on the narrow
interests of a few monied actors. Regardless, due to disagreement
between the Houses and the filibuster of Republican Senators, the
103d Congress was unable to produce any campaign finance re-
form.
143
C. Reform After the 1994 Mid-Term Election
The victory by the Republicans in the 1994 mid-term elections
may change the calculus of campaign finance." However, cam-
paign finance reform has yet to be addressed by the 104th Con-
gress. Ironically, the election of Republican majorities to both the
House and the Senate came in spite of an electoral system stacked
against non-incumbents. 4 This political shift has changed the
roles of Democrats. As a result, previous analyses focusing on the
Capitol Hill and tell them how they're supposed to vote on issues. And that's the distinc-
tion we think needs to be made. You need to separate the election process from the
legislative process." Id. But see Vicki Kemper, The Year of the Woman's Wallet, COM-
MON CAUSE, Winter 1992, at 4, 11 ("EMILY's List officials insist that they are not a
,special interest' and do not lobby members of Congress on legislative issues, but 'when
we send an envelope, they definitely know it's from EMILY's List,' says one. And with
that knowledge comes the kind of access that members of Congress give 'special inter-
ests."').
141. ALEXANDER & BAUER, supra note 44, at 135 (arguing that Members of Congress
view election reform as a means of enhancing the strengths of one party at the expense
of the other); see also Gans, supra note 94, at A23 (arguing that the House's measure
was nothing more than an attempt to further institutionalize the power of the Democratic
Party).
142. Ellen R. Malcolm, Reining in Big Givers, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Apr. 4, 1993, at
5D.
143. See J. Jennings Moss, Senate Stops Lobbying Bill, Forces Changes; GOP Willing
to Pass Gift Ban, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1994, at Al (noting that among other failed re-
forms, the 103d Congress failed to deliver any change in the structure of campaign fi-
nance).
144. Benjamin Sheffner, Fundraising in "Star Trek Territory," Now in Majority, Repub-
licans Are "Boldly Going Where We've Never Gone Before", ROLL CALL, Jan. 23, 1995,
available in LEXIS, Cmpgn Library, Allnws File.
145. See Politics and Money, CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR, Oct. 6, 1992, at 20 (noting the
institutionalized advantages that congressional incumbents have over challengers: free mail,
name recognition, and free press coverage).
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conflicting interests of House Democrats and Senate Democrats as
the greatest impediments to reform are no longer applicable. Al-
though there are Republican majorities in both houses, they are not
likely to reorder the campaign finance universe because, as the
majority party and as incumbents, it is automatically biased in their
favor.'" Furthermore, the Republicans had substantial fundraising
success in 1994, so there is no impetus for reform. 47 The lack of
"necessity" on the part of the Republicans to reform campaign fi-
nance unfortunately coincides with the first and best opportunity
for true reform to occur since 1974.'"
In light of the 1994 mid-term elections, it is difficult to deter-
mine whether the past trends in Congress will continue. If the
sources of the problems are structural, then there is little hope that
Congress will succeed in reforming campaign finance. However, if
past conflicts have been rooted in ideological conflict and partisan
gamesmanship, there may be some hope for legislative change due
to the massive political upheaval in Congress in the 1992 and 1994
elections.
D. FECA and the Interaction of the Courts and the FEC
Neither the FEC nor the courts have been able or willing to
curtail the use of intermediaries or conduits to circumvent contribu-
tion limits. Overcoming institutional inertia has been left to the
administrative and judicial branches, but the FEC and the federal
courts have failed to rectify the problem. Congress ensured that the
FEC would be a weak agency from the Agency's inception. By
establishing a commission consisting of equal numbers of Republi-
cans and Democrats, Congress guaranteed that partisan deadlock
146. See Greg D. Kubiak, GOP Contract Omits One Major Reform: Campaign Reform,
ROLL CALL, Jan. 23, 1995, at A-5 (noting that Congress has been known to preserve the
institutional advantages that incumbents have by killing campaign finance reform); Kevin
Phillips, Fat-Cat Revolutionaries; The Beginning of a Tax-cut Bidding War Cannot Dis-
guise that GOP Policies Tilt Toward the Fortune 500, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1994, at M1
(noting that the GOP leader on finance reform, Sen. Mitch McConnell, has pronounced
reform unlikely). Interestingly, campaign finance reform was not included in the
Republican's statement of intended legislative goals called its Contract With America.
Sheffner, supra note 144.
147. See Charles R. Babcock, Amway's 2.5 Million Gift to GOP the Largest Ever,
WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 1995, at Al (noting that the GOP succeeded in out-raising the
Democrats by nearly 4 to 1 in "soft money" in the closing days of the 1994 campaign);
Sheffner, supra note 144 (discussing the capability the Republicans will have to increase
their fundraising during the 104th Congress).
148. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text (discussing the 1974 reforms).
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would occur.'49 Without a strong commission, there are significant
incentives to knowingly violate FECA.50
V. CREATING A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR REFORM
Absent in the discussions of and attempts at reform are clear
parameters for change. Without clear goals and direction, reform
will not succeed. I recommend three goals: (1) increase voter par-
ticipation in elections; (2) increase voter access to information
indicating the source of candidates' financial support; and (3) re-
main within the limits of the Constitution.
One clear goal of reform must be to increase voter participa-
tion in elections. However, until voters see that candidates and
contributors are "more like us,'' there is little hope that true
participation, rooted in a feeling that the populace has a true stake
in the process, will increase.'52 Reform must facilitate greater in-
dividual participation and increase the number of individuals will-
ing to invest in campaigns.'53
Two measures of participation exist: voter turnout and
individuals contributing to candidates. Both measures are in de-
cline.'54 Participation could be enhanced through means that do
149. JACKSON, supra note 107, at 308-09 (noting that in creating the FEC the Congress
established a regulatory agency that had been captured by the subjects of its regulation
from the beginning of its existence).
150. Id. at 309 (noting that "the benefits of taking money in violation of the rules far
outweigh the slim risk of being caught and fined").
151. See TEIXEIRA, supra note 101, at 162 (quotation is paraphrase of Texeira's discus-
sion).
152. See id. at 155 (arguing that until Americans feel psychologically involved in the
political process it will not be easy to reconnect them and increase their participation).
But see Kubiak, supra note 146 (arguing that the first step to reconnecting the voters to
the process is the elimination of all special interest money).
153. See Jones, supra note 46, at 41 (stating that "perhaps when the system is 'im-
proved,' more citizens will be willing to contribute").
154. American voters have exhibited a steady decline in their turnout to vote in Presi-
dential elections since 1960. Kenneth M. Dolbeare, The Decay of American Democracy, in
POLITICAL ISSUES IN AMERICA: THE 1990s, 89, 90-91 (Philip J. Davies & Fredric A.
Waldstein eds., 1991). Turnout has generally been even worse for off-year elections. Id.
The percentage of small contributors giving to congressional candidates has also declined.
See SABATO, supra note 59, at 61. The percentage of individual contributors has declined
as well. Between 1978 and 1984, individual contributions to House and Senate candidates
declined from 61% of all contributors to just 49%. Id. at 83 n.2. More importantly, how-
ever, has been the reliance on a small number of large individual contributors for support
in elections. In 1992, less than one percent of the nation's population made contributions
of more than $200 dollars to candidates for federal office. However, that 1% accounted
for 77% of all individual contributions to federal campaigns. Jamin Raskin & John
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not relate to the financing of campaigns.' However, they are not
likely to connect the populace to the political process. 6 Greater
voter participation in the funding of campaigns may translate into
greater voter turnout because of increased voter motivation."7
Voter turnout is directly related to socioeconomic status, suggesting
a belief that only the wealthy can affect the political process; 5'
participation may increase if the middle and lower classes feel
more connected to this process. Currently, the view that candidates
are more interested in courting wealthy special interest groups
rather than obtaining popular support inhibits voter turnout.59
Campaign finance reform must encourage candidates to rely on
small to medium sized individual contributions and reduce the
incentive for candidates to simply pursue wealthy contributors or
those with connections providing access to such contributions.
Voters will turn out to vote only if they feel needed in the elector-
al process."
Another clear goal of campaign finance reform is to increase
access to information that enables voters to openly discuss and
evaluate candidates and issues. True evaluation of a candidate
requires that the validity of the candidate's platform be verified.
Voters should be able to identify and assess not only what the
candidate says, but also who else supports the candidate.' 6' This
is important, as many candidates refuse to accept PAC contribu-
tions, labeling them as "special interest" money, while at the same
Bonifaz, The Constitutional Imperative and Practical Superiority of Democratically Fi-
nanced Elections, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1160, 1177 (1994) (noting that the average contri-
bution of this group to congressional campaigns was $536.76).
155. Measures utilized in other countries have been proposed to increase American voter
turnout. These include compulsory voting, direct payments or other incentives to vote,
abolishing the bicameral legislature, adopting proportional representation, and elimination of
the electoral college. TEDMIRA, supra note 101, at 151-52.
156. Id. at 154 (noting that these solutions are all virtually impossible, would require
constitutional amendment to enact, or are contrary to traditional American values).
157. Id. at 156.
158. See Raskin & Bonifaz, supra note 154, at 1181-82. The authors note that voting is
an "affirmation of belonging" and reflects the attachment of voters to politics and govern-
ment. Id. at 1182. The appearance that government is responsive solely to wealth may
serve to create the detachment felt by voters. Id.
159. See id. at 1182 (noting that evidence suggests that people are more likely to vote
when the influence of wealthy contributors is reduced).
160. See TEDXIRA, supra note 101, at 161-62 (noting that greater influence of the ordi-
nary citizen, whether real or perceived, may enhance the responsiveness of government
and encourage greater turnout).
161. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976).
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time, accept bundled contributions from individuals affiliated with
those interests. 62 Political debate is enhanced when voters know
who supports a candidate and what the candidate truly believes.
The final goal of any campaign reform must be to withstand
constitutional challenge. It has been insincere for Congress to offer
reforms that will clearly be found unconstitutional. 63 True reform
can only occur when Congress offers a system that retains regula-
tory cohesiveness after judicial scrutiny."
VI. THE ROLE OF BUNDLING IN FEDERAL CAMPAIGNS
Because it is unlikely that Congress will pass any comprehen-
sive reform in the near future, the best approach for legislative
campaign finance reform is incremental reform. Incremental reform
is more desirable than comprehensive reform because the former is
more workable, 6  more realistic,"~ and can serve as the basis
for truly comprehensive change later.6 An incremental approach
would allow the modification of a known system rather than the
creation of an unknown one. 6s The faults and weaknesses of our
current system become more evident with each election. An incre-
mental approach resolves identifiable problems while hopefully pre-
serving the predictability of the outcome of such reforms. 9 The
first major campaign finance practice that needs to be addressed in
any incremental reform proposal is bundling.
Past reform has not addressed the problems posed by bun-
162. See infra note 179, 220 and accompanying text (giving examples of such candi-
dates).
163. The fact that the Senate in the 103d Congress passed a bill that openly acknowl-
edged its potential unconstitutionality by providing for an alternative to the outright ban
on PACs if found to be unconstitutional may simply be an attempt by the Senate to
aggressively approach reform. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text. However, it
is more likely that Congress is using campaign finance reform as a means of appearing to
act progressively while actually preserving the status quo. See supra notes 112, 163 &
134 and accompanying text (noting the political capital Congressmen gain by appearing to
seek campaign finance reform).
164. See Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm.,
470 U.S. 480, 518 (1985) (White, J. dissenting).
165. See Johannes & Nugent, supra note 84, at 269 (noting that "reforms must be
reasonable and workable if they are to succeed").
166. Id.
167. Magleby, supra note 45, at 257-58 (arguing that incremental reforms often lead to
later consideration of more comprehensive reform).
168. See SORAtU, supra note 48, at 209 (noting that refurbishing the status quo is
much less demanding and less speculative than redesigning it).
169. Id.
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dling. Even though the practice was recognized as early as
1976,70 neither the 1976 nor 1979 Amendments to FECA ad-
dressed it. In spite of the recognition that a significant loophole
existed, Congress failed to act.
171
For effective reform to occur, Congress must create a system
where compliance with the law places all on an equal footing.
Before such reform can occur, all avenues of circumvention must
be foreclosed. The most significant means of circumventing FECA
is through bundling. Bundling undermines the legitimacy of elec-
tions by enabling political committees and wealthy or well-connect-
ed individuals to exercise significant influence over elections with-
170. See supra text accompanying note 66 (discussing the Supreme Court's recognition
in Buckley of the possibility of circumvention of contribution limits through the use of
conduits or intermediaries).
171. For a discussion of the reasons reform attempts failed, see supra notes 83-103 and
accompanying text. The following exchange between Senators Dick Clark (D-IA) and
Bennett Johnston D-LA), in debating an amendment that would have allowed the national
and congressional party committees to contribute up to $20,000 to its candidates, serves
as an example of how the bundling problem is shrugged off during reform attempts.
Mr. CLARK. If we are going to allow $20,000 to go to a candidate, that
means we really open up and invite the possibility of earmarking. At least, we
make it extremely difficult to enforce the law against earmarking because then
we have a way to pass at least $20,000 out of an individual and into the
hands of a House or Senate Member.
Mr. JOHNSTON. The Senator is aware that there is a specific law which pro-
hibits the earmarking?
Mr. CLARK. Yes.
Mr. JOHNSTON. If someone, expressly or by implication, earmarks, then it is
the duty of the committee to so note that earmarking and it is the duty of the
candidate to report that as if it were a direct contribution from the original
donor and the final donee ....
Mr. CLARK. .. . But we have to be very concerned in the process of passing
this legislation that we do not invite difficulties in the enforcement of this law.
I think this would do so.
Mr. JOHNSTON. The Senator is not suggesting that the chairmen or the com-
mittees of this Congress would be party to circumventing that law, either ex-
pressly or impliedly?
Mr. CLARK. No.
122 CONG. REC. S3805 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 1976).
Although the $20,000 limit was not adopted, the NRSC's successful circumven-
tion of a similar limit by bundling direct contributions to Senate candidates' committees
in 1986 was the basis for Federal Election Comm'n v. National Republican Senatorial
Comm., 966 F.2d 1471 (D.C. Cir. 1992). See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
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out any notice of such influence to the electorate." The success
of bundling forces other political interests to engage in it or be left
behind.73
A. The Problems with Bundling
Earmarking, bundling, brokering, and other types of third party
fundraising have become significant sources of campaign funds. In
light of Federal Election Commission v. National Republican Sena-
torial Committee," statutory limits on bundling contributions
have been rendered meaningless. 75 Political interest organizations
that support federal candidates through bundled contributions have
proliferated recently.'76 Brokered contributions (contributions bun-
dled by conduits) have been called the "last frontier ... in the
regime of campaign finance."'7 Political committees, wealthy in-
dividuals, and parties have become experts at circumventing con-
tribution limits and "stretching the boundaries of the FECA lim-
its."'7 Many candidates eschew taking PAC or "special interest"
money, but accept contributions bundled by these entities."
172. Bedlington, supra note 63, at 81.
173. Id.
174. 966 F.2d 1471 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
175. See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text (discussing the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals' failure to require any substance to the regulatory language "direction or con-
trol").
176. Rick Pluta, Raising Dough; Candidates Have a Bundle to Lose, Clu. TRIB., Oct.
17, 1993, Womanews, at 1.
177. SORAUF, supra note 48, at 126-27.
178. Bedlington, supra note 63, at 77.
179. Two former members of Congress serve as examples of the willingness of mem-
bers to be strong advocates of reform yet accept money that has been "sanitized" from
bundling. Former Representative Mike Synar and Senator David Boren, both of Oklahoma,
advocated the elimination or significant diminution of PAC contributions in federal elec-
tions. Synar was embarrassed by a $2,000 fine levied by the FEC for the failure of his
campaign to amend its disclosure reports and provide information about contributors. Color
Rep. Mike Synar 'Embarrassed,' House Champion of Campaign Reform Pays $2,000 Fine
for Disclosure Violation, POL. FIN. & LOBBY REP., June 11, 1993, available in LEXIS,
Cmpgn Library, Allnws File (discussing the penalty levied against Synar by the FEC); Ed
Zuckerman, In Rep. Mike Synar's 'No PACs Allowed' Campaign, Special Interest Money
Still Flows into Coffers, PACs & LOBBIES, June 3, 1992, available in LEXIS, Cmpgn
Library, Allnws File (analyzing the campaign contributions of Rep. Synar for 1991). Addi-
tionally, Senator Boren refused PAC contributions but accepted over $250,000 in 1983-84
from executives and employees of the banking and energy industries. SABATO, supra note
59, at 21 (discussing the hypocrisy of refusing PAC contributions while taking contribu-
tions from individuals affiliated with the slme interests and industries as the PACs). For a
discussion of the difficulty in identifying bundled contributions, see infra notes 188-95
and accompanying text.
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Political committees, individuals, and parties rely on bundling
to increase their collective power in expressing their interests. The
motivation of each is similar:, bundling allows larger contributions
to candidates than would otherwise be allowed under the law.80
There is at least anecdotal evidence that PAC-sponsored bundling
has occurred within the Executive Branch to gain favor of a new
administration. 8' This behavior is not new. Traditional PACs
sponsored by corporations or labor unions bundle contributions to
increase the amount that they can provide to a candidate once they
have reached their statutory limit." Wealthy or influential indi-
viduals are also important sources of bundled contributions through
the practice known as brokering.'
Bundling is a means of enhancing individual participation in
the political process while increasing the accountability of the
organization acting as conduit for its members.'84 However, bun-
180. See David Dahl, Changing the Rules of Campaign Finance, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMEs, June 23, 1993, at 1A (identifying a political supporter who through bundling and
soft money effectively exceeded the $25,000 limit on contributions by an individual to
candidates for federal office by $375,000); Elizabeth Drew, Watch 'Er Squirm, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 14, 1993, § 6, at 33 (noting that bundling has enabled interests to raise
larger amounts for candidates than they could have as a PAC and enabled candidates to
"forsake" PAC money); Michael Ross, Senate Ends Filibuster on Election Reform, L.A.
TIMES, June 17, 1993, at Al (noting that reform legislation was needed to prevent the
circumvention of campaign contribution limits through the use of bundling).
181. Alan C. Miller, USDA Staffers Were Targets of '92 Clinton Fund Raising, L.A.
TIMEs, Nov. 19, 1994, at Al (reporting that then Representative Mike Espy and Grant B.
Buntrock, later appointed to be Secretary of Agriculture and the head of the Agricultural
Stabilization and Conservation Service, respectively, bundled contributions from upper-man-
agement employees of USDA, by funneling them through the Farmers & Ranchers '92
PAC-many participants in this fundraising scheme were promoted after Clinton's victory).
182. SomAuI, supra note 48, at 55 ("If the PAC . . . has reached its statutory limit on
contributions to candidate Spendmore . . . it may collect the checks of individuals made
out to Spendmore, bundle them, and forward them to the candidate, ostentatiously taking
credit.").
183. See supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text. Sorauf argues that the 1974
Amendments left brokers virtually untouched because they were neither the origin nor the
final destination of contributions. SORAUF, supra note 48, at 54. The brokers of yesterday
often acted in official party roles. Id. Due to the decline of political parties, the principal
brokers are no longer party leaders but today are individuals protecting their own inter-
ests. Id. Brokers are seen as the traditional conduits for the "fat cat" contributors; bun-
dlers gather other people's money for a candidate and claim credit for the contributions.
Id. Sorauf distinguishes between traditional brokering and modem bundling, finding that
"the Charles Keatings may well bundle without being called bundlers" Id. at 54-55. For
the purposes of this Note, brokering and bundling are treated similarly because they func-
tion in a similar manner: the use of a third party conduit to arrange campaign contribu-
tions who benefits personally from affiliating with both the contributor and candidate to
circumvent campaign reporting and contribution regulations.
184. Bedlington, supra note 63, at 81 (discussing the claim that earmarking or bundling
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dling by political committees or other interest groups creates signif-
icant problems.
Institution-initiated bundling gives campaign contributors and
watchdogs a false sense of democratic participation. When an orga-
nization directs individuals to earmark their contributions or bun-
dles for a particular candidate, an appearance of greater individual
participation is created than actually exists."5 The contributor
may or may not recognize that the organization or broker receives
the political credit for the contributions. 6 Additionally, on re-
ports filed with the FEC,8 7 the candidate can point to a large
number of individual contributions as evidence of popular support
when, in reality, they may represent a limited or institutional inter-
est. If a candidate is supported by groups that bundle a very large
number of small contributions, and if these contributors belong or
adhere to relatively minor and isolated interests, an illusion of
widespread support may be created absent disclosure of the real
entity behind the support.
This illusion is enhanced by the difficulty in identifying bun-
dling organizations through the disclosure documents candidates file
with the FEC. 8 Due to improper and inadequate disclosure of
contributors, bundled contributions may go unidentified. 9 Bun-
actually increases individual campaign participation by encouraging greater participation
with the sponsoring organization-this, in turn, increases the members' oversight of the
organization, which increases accountability); see also infra notes 208-13 and accompany-
ing text.
185. See ANN B. MATASAR, CORPORATE PACs AND FEDERAL CAMPAIGN FINANCING
LAWS 53 (1986) (noting that bundling or earmarking enables PACs to provide its mem-
bers a means to "participate" in a campaign and enhances the appearance of democracy).
186. See SORAUF, supra note 48, at 55 (pointing out that PACs get all the benefits of
direct contributions to a candidate simply by bundling individual contributions); Glenn F.
Bunting, The Washington Connection/Glenn F. Bunting: Feinstein, Boxer Seek Loophole
for Emily, L.A. TIMES, June 4, 1993, at A3 (noting that, by bundling, "EMILY's List
collects the political credit for providing far more money to candidates than it would
otherwise get").
187. See generally 2 U.S.C. § 434 (1994) (providing guidelines for such reports).
188. SABATO, supra note 59, at 21 (As an example, the author quotes Democratic Con-
gressional Campaign Committee's former director, Martin D. Franks, "'instead of getting
one check from Lockheed corporation's PAC we'll get five $1,000 checks from house-
wives . . . with no mention that their spouses are executives with Lockheed.').
189. Candidates are required to disclose the name, address, and employer of contributors
who make contributions of more than $200. See supra text accompanying notes 13-16.
However, most campaigns fail to comply with this requirement, allowing industries that
bundle to go unnoticed. See Mark Stencel, "Bundling" Skirts Campaign Gift Curbs; Cor-
porate Contributions Outlawed, But Executives Raise Large Amounts, WASH. POST, Apr.
20, 1992, at Al (noting that many corporate executives who participated in bundling
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dling is characterized by a large number of related or identical
contributions occurring on the same day.' ° For example, bundling
is evidenced when employees or executives of a single firm or
industry simultaneously make large contributions to a single candi-
date, 9' or when a significant number of large contributions from
concentrated areas outside of the candidate's home region occur at
the same time."9 Another indicator of bundling is when an indi-
vidual who makes a contribution lists employment as a homemaker
or retired. Even if the information is accurate, the use of such des-
ignations may disguise the contributor's affiliation to another entity
through a spouse or former employer."3 Additionally, when con-
tributions come directly from individuals employed in industries or
corporations that sponsor PACs, and the individual contribution is
in addition to any contributions by such affiliated PACs, bundling
may be occurring.'94 Thus, identification of bundling operations
requires access to a list of individuals who are members of or
affiliated with the organization that is bundling contributions and
the FEC reports of the recipient. 95
As an example of one such identification process, the Product
Liability Coordinating Committee succeeded in comparing the FEC
contribution reports of Pennsylvania Senator Harris Wofford with
the membership list of the Association of Trial Lawyers of Ameri-
ca (ATLA) prior to the November 1994 election. 6 Their study
disclosed that, with five months to go before the election, bundling
drives for candidates in the 1992 election were not easily identifiable due to non-disclo-
sure by the candidates). The failure of campaigns to fully identify their contributors is a
significant problem. Between January 1, 1991 and March 31, 1992, congressional incum-
bents failed to fully disclose the identities of contributors of over $8 million. Glenn R.
Simpson, Hill Incumbents Fail to Disclose Correctly Contributors Who Gave Total of $8
Million, ROLL CALL, July 2, 1992, available in LEXIS, Cmpgn Library, Allnws File.
190. Mark Krewatch & Glenn R. Simpson, The Generous Lindner Circle; Cincinnati
Financier, Mentor to Charles Keating, Gives $1.5 Million to Candidates with His Circle
of Donors; Favored Recipients Include Dole, McEwen, McConnell, ROLL CALL, June 17,
1991, available in LEXIS, CMPGN File, ALLNWS Library.
191. SABATO, supra note 59, at 21.
192. Zuckerman, supra note 179.
193. 1&
194. SABATO, supra note 59, at 21.
195. See Stencel, supra note 189 (noting that often the only means of identifying contri-
butors who have bundled contributions is by comparing FEC lists of contributions with
lists of corporate executives and firm partners).
196. Review & Outlook: Tommy's List, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 1994, at A22 [hereinafter
Review & Outlook] (noting that ATLA contributions were identified by comparing the
membership of the organization with contributors to federal campaigns).
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
by ATLA had generated over $150,000 in contributions for the
Senator.197
Although bundling as a means of influence peddling is obvi-
ously a problem, several other concerns arise from individuals
brokering contributions. First, the conduit and not the individual
generally receives credit for the contribution that is conveyed.'98
Even though the conduit's contribution can legally be no larger
than that of the other contributors, the candidate's gratitude and
attention will be directed toward the organizing intermediary.'"
Additionally, the interests of the conduit and those of the contribu-
tors he organizes do not necessarily coincide." The individual
contributor with a true interest in supporting the candidate may
unintentionally further and perpetuate the power and interests of the
conduit."' Finally, contributions that are bundled by individuals
differ from PAC contributions only in that the true organizational
or ideological interest of the contribution goes unreported.'
The political parties themselves are also important sources of
bundled contributions. Although fundraising conducted jointly by a
candidate for Congress and one of the congressional campaign
committees is allowed by law,"03 the party committees have
turned to bundling as a means of quickly raising large amounts of
money.' Bundling enables the national party committees, as well
197. Id.
198. SORAuF, supra note 48, at 54 (arguing that the conduit, and not the individual
contributor, reaps the benefit of the candidate's gratitude for the contributions).
199. Id. at 54, 126.
200. Id. at 125 (observing that in brokered contributions, the goals of the conduit, the
candidate, and the contributor may or may not coincide-however, the goals of the con-
duit will always drive the transaction); see also Federal Election Comm'n v. National
Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 513-14 (1985) (White, J., dissenting)
(arguing that it "can safely be assumed that each contributor does not fully support" all
the actions of the conduit through which he contributes).
201. See SoRAuF, supra note 48, at 126 (arguing that the conduit or intermediary is
always benefited in brokering contributions and becomes more powerful with each election
due to the conduit's ability to raise large contributions quickly).
202. Id. at 90 (noting that contributions that are bundled by out-of-state or out-of-district
interests "have most of the characteristics of PAC contributions").
203. See 11 C.F.R. § 102.17 (1995).
204. FEC, Rejecting Legal Staffs Advice, Dismisses Complaints Against GOP
Fundraising for 1990 Senate Races, PACs & LOBBiEs, Nov. 8, 1991, available in LEXIS,
Cmpgn Library, Allnws File (discussing allegations made by the Democratic Senatorial
Campaign Committee and Common Cause that the Republican Senatorial Inner Circle
1990 had engaged in "an improper contribution 'bundling' scheme"); see also Bedlington,
supra note 63, at 80 (noting that due to the success of the National Republican Senatorial
Committee (NRSC) in 1984 and 1986 raising funds by acting as a conduit, the National
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as the congressional campaign committees, to arrange contributions
that would otherwise violate FECA limits to federal candidates
once they have reached the statutory limits for direct party contri-
butions.'
Bundling by party committees, as distinguished from non-party
political committees or individuals, creates additional issues for
consideration. First, the FEC has yet to differentiate between bun-
dling by party committees where the party exercises direction or
control over the contribution, which violates the regulations, and
when the party and the candidate conduct joint fundraising, which
does not violate the regulations.2") Next, the practice of party
bundling, in essence, makes access to the nation's most important
decision-makers subject to a requisite contribution to the party's
candidates, 7 which is not in the country's best interests.
Republican Congressional Committee began its own bundling program in 1988).
205. Bedlington, supra note 63, at 80 (noting that the national committees, especially
the Republicans, have engaged in bundling in situations when the committees have made
the maximum contribution possible to candidates engaged in competitive races). Bedlington
notes that in spite of the fact that parties traditionally abstained from bundling due to the
administrative difficulties of bundling, the NRSC and National Republican Committee have
utilized the practice to circumvent contribution limits. Id.
206. Id. at 80-81 (noting that the FEC has failed to resolve crucial questions relating to
joint fundraising and bundling). In the wake of the problems that emerged from the
NRSC's activities in 1986, it appears that there is tacit acceptance by the party commit-
tees of what constitutes joint fundraising versus bundling. FEC, Rejecting Legal Staffs
Advice, Dismisses Complaints Against GOP Fundraising for 1990 Senate Races, supra
note 204. By a 5-0 vote, the Commission refused to act against the NRSC's 1990
fundraising activities, noting that
the joint fundraising notice sent by the respondents clearly stated (1) the names
of all participating committees; (2) the allocation formula for all funds received;
(3) that contributors could designate their contributions to a particular participant
or participants; (4) that the allocation would change if a contribution would
violate the permissible contribution limits; and, (5) that contributions from
sources which are prohibited from contributing under the Act would be allocat-
ed to a non-federal account of the NRSC.
Id. A cynic may observe that joint fundraising is only bundling that complies with those
provisions of the FECA that have been previously enforced by the Commission.
207. JACKSON, supra note 107, at 99. Jackson writes,
The GOP had been marketing contacts with its own most powerful policy-mak-
ers since capturing the White House and the Senate in 1980 .... The limit-
skirting "bundling party" . . . at which PAC managers posed for pictures with
the President after donating $20,000 to GOP House candidates, was only a
variation of this access-peddling game.
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B. Asserted Justifications for Bundling
Two justifications have been offered in support of the need to
continue bundling: support of disadvantaged candidates and in-
creased individual participation in the electoral process. Neither is
persuasive.
Bundling has been advocated as a means of facilitating partici-
pation by groups long ignored by the political process."' Specific
quasi-PACs have emerged to fill such roles. For example,
AMERICA'S Fund was launched in 1993 to support minority
candidates for office.' A fund for Democratic women candi-
dates, EMILY's List, has been in existence since 198521 and was
an important contributor to candidates for both state and federal
offices in 1992."' The success of EMILY's List has fostered the
growth of similar organizations that focus on state and local wom-
en candidates. 2 Other political interests have begun to utilize
208. See, e.g., Adam Clymer, Senate Approves Brady Legislation and Trade Accord,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1993, at Al (quoting Rep. Barney Frank of Massachusetts stated
that "'women and blacks"' argue that "they depend on 'cooperative fund-raising"). Ellen
Malcolm, the founder and president of EMILY's List, has stated that: "'I find myself in
the ludicrous position of defending EMILY's List, which I think is the most effective
electoral reform we've seen in 10 years .... .' Helen Dewar, EMILY's List Falls Prey
to PAC Hunt: Group Thrived in Loophole that Campaign Finance Bill Could Close,
WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 1993, at A14.
209. AMERICA'S Fund (Achieving More Equitable Representation In the Congress And
States) supports black, Hispanic, and Asian candidates who support issues that are impor-
tant to racial or ethnic groups. It functions by recruiting members who join by paying
$100 and agreeing to make two similar contributions during each federal election cycle to
candidates endorsed by the fund. Joyce Jones, The Color of Money, BLACK ENTERPRIsE,
Feb. 1994, at 28, 28.
210. Id.
211. AMERICA'S Fund modeled itself after EMILY's List (Early Money Is Like Yeast).
The only difference between their fundraising structures is that EMILY's List requires
aggregate contributions of $200 to candidates it endorses, while members of AMERICA'S
List are required to make two $100 contributions. Id. EMILY's List refers to its method
of fundraising as "networking" rather than bundling, but the process is the same. See
Peggy Reynolds, Mercer Islander Is Key to Getting Women Elected, SEATLE TIMES, May
10, 1993, at C3.
212. There has been an emergence of committees supporting women candidates that are
not only pro-Democratic but also pro-Republican. Many of these groups focus on abortion
rights: e.g., Kentucky's Emma's List; Maryland's Harriet's List; and Utahns For Choice.
See Kentucky: "Women Gear Up for Belated Political Gains", AM. POL. NETWORK ABOR-
TION REP., Oct. 15, 1993 available in LEXIS, Cmpgn Library, Allnws File (discussing
Emma's List's desire to "steer its members' individual contributions to candidates it en-
dorses" to circumvent the state's $500 limit on PAC contributions); Maryland: Harriet's
List Focuses on Pro-Choice Women, AM. POL. NETWORK ABORTION REP., Jan. 7, 1994,
available in LEXIS, Cmpgn Library, Alinws File (discussing the Harriet's List's intention
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bundling in an attempt to increase their ability to influence elec-
tions and increase their power." 3
Although groups like EMILY's List are promoted as a means
of enabling candidates from traditionally under-represented groups
to compete politically, the large number of failed challenges to
incumbents by women indicates that bundling has not enabled
women to overcome the inherent systemic bias toward incum-
bents." 4 Some women political activists reject the notion that
bundling can create a level playing field for elections and call for
the elimination of all loopholes that promote incumbency.1 The
attempt to exempt some bundling may be a covert way to support
incumbents.1 6
The claim that bundling promotes participation also appears
flawed. True participation requires the individual to do something
more than financially support a political cause. The exemption for
non-connected PACs has been justified as an effective way to
enhance participation.2 7 However, the true motive may be to in-
crease the power of those political committees who are able to
raise the most money. 8 The benefits of the contribution truly
to support non-incumbent women running for state legislature and other statewide cam-
paigns through bundled contributions); Utah: Pro-Choicers to Increase Involvement in
Elections, AM. POL. NETwORK ABORTION REP., Sept. 1, 1993, available in LEXIS,
Cmpgn Library, Allnws File (discussing the Utahns For Choice's intention to take a great-
er role in statewide elections and help candidates supporting abortion rights regardless of
gender).
213. For example, the League of Conservation Voters initiated a bundling program,
EarthList, for the 1994 elections. Due to its success, the League hopes to triple the
amount that it raised in 1994 by bundling for the 1995-1996 election cycle. A. Martin
Willis, Environmental Lobbies Aren't Alarmed by Prospects of a GOP-Held Congress,
POLITICAL FIN. & LOBBY REP., Nov. 23, 1994, available in LEXIS, Cmpgn Library,
Allnws File. Conservative groups have begun bundling programs. Madison Project was
founded in an attempt to funnel small contributions to candidates supported by the group.
Robert O'Harrow Jr. & Kent Jenkins Jr., Virginia Notebook, WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 1993,
at V03.
214. Elizabeth Schwinn, Lobby Laws: Women May Win an Exemption, TIMES-PICAYUNE
(La.), Oct. 31, 1993, at A10 (noting that in 1992, despite large contributions provided by
bundling, 38 of 40 women facing incumbents lost).
215. Id. (noting the opinion of Margery Tabankin, the leader of the Hollywood
Women's Political Committee).
216. Id.
217. See EMILY's List in Michigan: 'Scent of a Woman' or 'Indecent Proposal'?, POL.
FIN. & LOBBY REt'., Aug. 25, 1993, at 1, 5. Judith Corley, a former attorney at the FEC,
described EMILY's List as "an administrative convenience to its membership....
[I]nstead of having to mail contributions to up to eight candidates, a contributor needs to
mail only to EMILY's List." Id.; see also Bunting, supra note 186, at A3.
218. Bunting, supra note 186, at A3.
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accrue to the entity bundling rather than to the contributor.2"9 In
fact, individuals who contribute through intermediaries may unwit-
tingly support political causes that are not their own. EMILY's List
acknowledges that the organization would not be as successful if it
relied on its members to send contributions directly to each woman
candidate they wished to support.' Thus, bundling may only
give the perception of participation.22' Moreover, pseudo-participa-
tion, where an organized interest benefits from the contributions of
individuals, cannot be legitimately called an advancement for par-
ticipatory democracy.
Two arguments have been raised justifying the related practice
of brokering. First is the claim that brokering allows individuals
with common political interests to organize themselves in an ad
hoc manner to participate in the political process without formally
organizing as a PAC or interest group.' The intermediary will
organize a fundraising event, bring together individuals with specif-
ic interests, and forward their contributions to the candidate
"guest."2' The second justification for individuals bundling or
brokering contributions is pure influence peddling. 4 By arranging
for a significant number of associates and acquaintances to make
large contributions to a candidate, an individual may manipulate
the candidate's legislative agenda to favor the interests of the indi-
vidual.'
The contention that certain groups should be exempted from
219. See supra notes 186, 198-99 and accompanying text.
220. Bunting, supra note 186, at A3 (citing the additional paperwork required of contri-
butors to send checks and disclosure forms directly to candidates supported by the PAC).
221. See MATASAR, supra note 185, at 55.
222. See SORAUF, supra note 48, at 89-90 (noting that often Senatorial candidates will
venture to raise funds outside their state at informal "receptions" that are organized
around a common bond between the candidate and contributors like religion, ethnicity,
profession, or policy interest).
223. Id. at 90-91.
224. See Miller, supra note 181 (noting the link between contributions by USDA em-
ployees and their subsequent advancement as well as appointment of the conduits to im-
portant positions at USDA). Charles Keating is a prime example of an individual
brokering large contributions for federal candidates simply to enhance his own position.
ALEXANDER & BAUER, supra note 44, at 79-80. Charles Keating himself is the best
spokesman for this justification for bundling. He once stated, "'One question, among
many, has had to do with whether my financial support in any way influenced several
political figures to take up my cause. I want to say in the most forceful way I can: I
certainly hope so."' Id. at 80.
225. ALEXANDER & BAUER, supra note 44, at 79.
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the bundling prohibition because they do not "lobby" artificial-
ly distinguishes structure from purpose. This view seems to advo-
cate the theory that lobbying only occurs when influence is applied
to guarantee a specific legislative outcome. However, these advo-
cates of the lobbying and non-lobbying distinction ignore the fact
that support of candidates who meet the group's litmus test is a
means of guaranteeing specific legislative outcomes in multiple
situations. The definition of lobbying is difficult to establish. The
process of lobbying cannot be separated from the results of lobby-
ing. If direct lobbying of a candidate produces the same result as
indirect pressure, exerted by the need for contributions for the next
election, then the two are indistinguishable. If campaign contribu-
tions affect the way that a candidate decides a legislative issue,
then such action must be classified as lobbying.
Furthermore, the basis for allowing only some PACs to bundle
rests on the claim that non-connected committees 7 have less in-
terest in the legislative process than do affiliated ones. Advocates
of this claim assert that non-connected committees are benign, as
they do not seek to affect legislative outcomes through lobbying
activities. This view is based upon the assumption that the con-
nected PACs dominate the field of lobbying and campaign dona-
tions. While corporate, labor, and trade association PACs represent
the largest category of PACs, the largest growth in PACs between
1977 and 1994 occurred in non-connected PACs.' The relative
strength of the connected committees would likely decline if Con-
gress were to exempt non-connected PACs from any prohibition of
bundling.
The distinction between connected PACs or separate segregat-
ed funds (SSFs) sponsored by corporations or unions and non-
connected PACs is artificial when their fundraising activities and
contribution practices are similar. When an SSF decides to support
226. See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
227. The FEC has interpreted 11 C.F.R. § 106.6A as dealing with non-connected PACs
to "include[] any committee which conducts activity in connection with an election but
which is not a party committee, an authorized committee, or a separate segregated fund."
Reallocation of Federal and State Expenses (AO 1993-3), Fed. Election Camp. Fin. Guide
(CCH) I 6083 n.2 (Apr. 2, 1993) (citation omitted).
228. From 1977 to 1994, the number of non-connected PACs increased from 110 to
980 or by 791%. PAC Count, FEC Recent Release (Dec. 31, 1994), available in LEXIS,
Cmpgn Library, Fecrel File. During the same period, the three combined categories of
corporate, labor, and trade association PACs increased from 1,222 to 2,785, or by 128%.
Id. (showing a slight decline in the number of PACs for 1994 in both the corporate,
labor, and trade association category and non-connected category).
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a candidate and solicits contributions on the candidate's behalf, the
SSF engages in conduct that the FEC interprets as direction or
control and is subject to the double counting provision of
FECA 9 The standard procedure followed by organizations that
bundle is to obligate members to contribute a designated amount to
candidates chosen by the PAC during each election cycle." The
FEC has not held this type of action to constitute "direction or
control" over contributions." The affiliation of a PAC to a cor-
poration, union, or bank as opposed to an ideological or political
entity should not be the basis for regulation when the activities of
the two groups are the same. While legitimate concern exists for
the improper use of SSFs of the parent entity, no logical basis
exists for creating and maintaining separate reporting and contribu-
tion regulations for ideological or political PAC's when the two act
in an identical manner.
Administratively, it would be difficult to distinguish PACs that
do not lobby from those that do. 2  It is impossible to justify, in
the name of reform, regulations that protect a single interest to the
detriment of similar interests." The 1994 House proposal for
campaign finance reform, H.R. 3,4 would have required the FEC
to "divide PACs into 'good' and bad." 5 Allowing only non-con-
nected PACs or other political interests to bundle would lead to
judicial challenges, 6 reorganization of affiliated PACs as uncon-
229. See AOR 1976-92, supra note 70 (In the actions of Boeing Corporation's SSF, the
Commission held that when the SSF makes a determination to support a specific candi-
date and then solicits contributions from the campaign accounts of its managers, the PAC
must count such contributions as contributions by both the PAC and the individuals in
accordance with the regulations); see also supra notes 32-42 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 209-11 and accompanying text.
231. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
232. The House proposal would have allowed virtually any non-business, labor, or trade
organization PAC to continue bundling. See Dewar, supra note 208. Whether a PAC is
truly independent or non-connected is really a matter of organization and semantics. Any
group can sponsor a PAC or other political committee that complies with the bundling
exemption and still effectively lobby or represent institutional legislative concerns through
another separate entity. Ellen S. Miller & Thomas Asher, Campaign Finance: Closing a
Loophole, WASH. POST, May 19, 1993, at A19 (discussing the impossibility of effectively
creating an exemption favoring a limited number of political committees).
233. Pluta, supra note 176, at 1 (arguing that "[y]ou can't write a set of rules that
applies only to a particular PAC . . . that represents only the good guys").
234. See H.R. 3, supra note 135, § 501.
235. Emily's Lesson, WASH. POST, Apr. 12, 1993, at A18.
236. For a bundling exception to be found constitutional, Congress would have to allow
virtually every organization that wishes to continue or begin bundling; it is impossible to
protect a single group or interest. See Miller & Asher, supra note 232. "To avoid uncon-
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nected ones, 7 or direct circumvention by excluded PACs and
interests.2 8 Non-connected PACs are no better than affiliated
PACs in their manipulation of candidates and elections.' 9 Due to
the lack of institutional control and oversight over non-connected
PACs, they may be worse for the electoral process than affiliated
PACs.2' Allowing some PACs to bundle at the exclusion of oth-
ers may encourage greater utilization of bundling as candidates
pressure PACs for increased contributions to offset new statutory
limits.
24 1
Although the evils of bundling have been discussed, it is im-
portant to note that political committees play an important electoral
role. Organizations engaged in bundling have traditionally been
organized as PACs. An argument can be made that political com-
mittees have a legitimate role in the political process. 2 As a sur-
rogate for political parties,243 they offer contributors an ideologi-
stitutionality, the door must be open to other voluntary PACs-Phyllis Schlafly's List, the
Toxic Waste Industry's List and the mega-bundlers of Hollywood and Wall Street. Loop-
holes simply do not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint, and one person's 'good
cause' is another's anathema." Id. The courts will not support any reform that limits the
ability of truly independent groups to attempt to influence campaigns and the right of
individuals to maximize their point of view through the collective use of resources. Gans,
supra note 94, at 23.
237. See Emily's Lesson, supra note 235, at A18; see also Miller & Asher, supra note
232, at A19 (noting that PACs will simply find a means of complying with the exception
through modification of their organization).
238. See Jeffrey Denny, Staking a Claim, Washington's Influence Industry Invests in
Change, COMMON CAUSE, Oct-Dec. 1992, available in LEXIS, Cmpgn Library, Allnws
File (noting that "[t]o allow EMILY's List to bundle is to allow (Wall Street firm)
Goldman, Sachs to bundle").
239. See Latus, supra note 129, 151-61 (discussing the activities of 10 ideological PACs
and comparing them to their corporate and labor counterparts).
240. JOHN M. THIELMANN & AL WlHITE, DISCRIMINATION AND CONGRESSIONAL CAM-
PAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS 51 (1991) (Because non-connected organizations have no "parent"
to oversee the PAC, "the nonconnected PACs are more likely ... to test the bounds of
the FECA.").
241. See JACKSON, supra note 107, at 306 (discussing the adverse impact to some
PACs that an earlier proposal to reform campaign contributions would have); see also
Review & Outlook, supra note 196, at A22 (analyzing the link between contributions by
the Association of Trial Lawyers of America (ATLA) and Senatorial actions favorable to
the association).
242. This is not to say that PACs do not exhibit significant problems. Before the 1994
congressional election, PACs alienated many Republicans by their exclusive support of
Democratic candidates, who may or may not hold the same ideological views. Two
Cheers for PACs, ROLL CALL, May 10, 1993, available in LEXIS, CMPGN library,
ALLNWS file [hereinafter Two Cheers]. Additionally, many PACs donate to both candi-
dates, indicating that their sole purpose in contributing is to purchase influence. Id.
243. PACs offer interest groups outside the parties the opportunity to influence policy.
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cally cohesive organization that is supported by the contributions of
"members" who collectively express their interests.2" As the pop-
ularity and importance of political parties have declined,245 politi-
cal committees and other interest organizations have become surro-
gates for the strong precinct or voting district party organization;
non-party political and interest organizations often fulfill the role of
organizing and motivating the electorate. Today, the political "pre-
cinct" is not a geographical one but rather an economic, ideologi-
cal, labor, or business precinct.'" These party surrogates represent
collective interests that enable those with similar ideas, goals, or
issues to collectively advocate their position.247 Within a regulated
context, these surrogates may represent the essence of republican
pluralism.
In a system where parties no longer maintain the cohesiveness that they once did, interest
groups have effectively utilized PACs to express their narrow legislative and political
interests. See John W. Hays, PACS in Kentucky: Regulating the Permanent Committees,
76 KY. LJ. 1011, 1016 (1988) (concluding that "the increasing political pluralism of the
United States during the 1970s and 1980s made PACs valuable political tools for groups
not affiliated with traditional sources of political power").
244. See Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S.
238, 261 (1986) (stating that "individuals contribute to a political organization in part
because they regard such a contribution as a more effective means of advocacy than
spending the money under their own personal direction").
245. See Broder, supra note 94, at C1 (noting that since World War II, the decline in
voter turnout has largely been a reflection of the decline of the parties' power and their
ability to mobilize the electorate).
246. Id. Comparing the role that PACs play in modem elections with that played by the
precinct organizer, one finds that both serve to energize their constituents, encourage their
support for a specific result, and contribute the time or money necessary to support a
successful campaign. Id.
247. See Two Cheers, supra note 242; see also Edwards, supra note 94, at A22 (noting
that by pooling resources, PACs legitimately protect the legislative interest that they have
by attempting to influence the outcome of elections). The Supreme Court has held that
PACs are protected by the First Amendment freedom of association. See Federal Election
Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 494 (1985)
(citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 22). Nothing in their organization or purpose justi-
fies diminishing their constitutional protection, because PACs are "mechanisms by which
large numbers of individuals of modest means can join together in organizations which
serve to 'amplif[y] the voice of their adherents."' Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
at 22).
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VII. PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
A. Bundling Reform as a First Step
Political organizations and individuals may facilitate greater
debate and participation in the political process if they deal openly
with contributions and candidates. The information available to the
public regarding political committees is much greater than that
about individuals or organizations that legally evade reporting re-
quirements.2" The reporting of contributions made through or by
a political committee to a congressional candidate may evidence
the candidate's ideological tendencies or, at the least, his legislative
agenda. As stated by Justice O'Connor in Massachusetts Citizens
For Life, full disclosure of contributions and expenditures "serves
the important governmental interest of 'shed[ding] the light of
publicity' on campaign financing, thereby helping voters to evaluate
the constituencies of those who seek federal office." 249 Permitting
bundling without full disclosure allows intermediaries to circumvent
the law and hide those who support them from public view."
Thus, a first step to reform must address the practice of bun-
dling. With the popularity of bundling increasing over the last ten
years, any reform that is not coupled with significant modification
of bundling will not succeed because the reform can be immediate-
ly circumvented2 ' Any elimination of or reduction in the ability
248. See supra notes 4-18 and accompanying text (discussing the disclosure requirements
for political committees).
249. Massachusetts Citizens For Life, 479 U.S. 238, 265 (1986) (alteration in original)
(O,Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 81). In Massachusetts
Citizens For Life, the Supreme Court addressed the concern that allowing MCFL to con-
duct independent expenditures with its corporate resources would open the door to "mas-
sive undisclosed ... spending by similar entities, and to their use as conduits for undis-
closed spending." Id. at 262. The Court stated that, due to the regulation of independent
expenditures under FECA, this concern is unfounded because any expenditure greater than
$250 would trigger the disclosure requirements of 2 U.S.C. § 434(c), which requires dis-
closure of any contributor who provides more than $200 per year to the committee. Id.
These requirements are circumvented by some political organizations and individuals who
bundle. They avoid disclosing the names of contributors because they are either not orga-
nized officially as PACs or the contributors' aggregate contributions are less than $200.
See infra note 274.
250. See infra note 278 (noting the Supreme Court's inference in Buckley that an in-
formed public is the best prevention against politicians catering to hidden supporters).
251. See Johannes & Nugent, supra note 84, at 275-76 (arguing that if bundling is not
prohibited, other proposed campaign reforms may result in even greater use of conduits or
intermediaries to circumvent the limits on contributions).
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of political committees, especially PACs, to contribute to congres-
sional candidates would require control of bundling. 2 Contrary
to their claims, 3 political committees that act as conduits for
campaign contributions do influence the legislative agenda of can-
didates. 4 By coordinating contributions, political committees ex-
ert great pressure on a candidate." Congress has been lulled into
the mistaken notion that bundled contributions are more democratic
than money from PACs, even though money raised by bundling
has essentially the same characteristics as PAC contributions. 6
252. SABATO, supra note 59, at 20-21 (discussing the modification of PAC money into
bundled contributions or soft money if PACs were to be subject to further limitations).
253. See Malcolm, supra note 142, at 5D (arguing that "donor networks [that bundle]
such as EMILY's list . . . exact no quid pro quo for campaign donations").
254. An excellent example of this influence is seen in the case of Senators Boxer and
Feinstein of California. The two benefited a great deal from the efforts of EMILY's List
in their 1992 campaigns. During the 103d Congress, they led the fight in the Senate to
maintain the group's ability to bundle contributions for Democratic women. Bunting, supra
note 186, at A3. The fallacy in the argument put forward by supporters of EMILY's List
is illustrated by Ellen Miller, the director of the Center for Responsive Politics, who
states, "The reality is EMILY's List chooses candidates who agree with them and lobby
(the candidates) by the very fact that they hold a carrot out. . . . The carrot is the mon-
ey." Id.
The issue should not be whether a group lobbies, but whether a group is corrupting
the candidate. The Supreme Court's definition of corruption in National Conservative
Political Action Committee describes the practice of bundling; the Court wrote that "[c]or-
ruption is a subversion of the political process. Elected officials are influenced to act con-
trary to their obligations of office by the prospect of financial gain to themselves or
infusions of money into their campaigns." 470 U.S. 480, 497. Clearly, where a candidate
modifies his or her position in order to obtain or maintain financial support for his or her
campaign, the possibility of corruption exists. The view of corruption as simply a quid
pro quo for the candidate's personal benefit is too limited an assessment of the problem.
Justice White in his dissent in National Conservative Political Action Committee noted
that the process by which many groups decide which candidates they will support publicly
and financially requires candidates to complete questionnaires showing their political align-
ment with the group. Justice White quoted one Senator as follows:
"[The] current system of financing congressional elections . . . virtually forces
Members of Congress to go around hat in hand, begging for money from
Washington-based special interest groups, political action committees whose sole
purpose for existing is to seek a quid pro quo. . . . We see the degrading
spectacle of elected representatives completing detailed questionnaires on their
positions on special interest issues, knowing that the monetary reward of PAC
support depends on the correct answers."
Id. at 517 (citation omitted)(quoting Sen. Eagleton)(White, J., dissenting).
255. See Daniel H. Lowenstein, A Patternless Mosaic: Campaign Finance and the First
Amendment After Austin, 21 CAP. U. L. REv. 381, 398 (1992) (noting that when contri-
butors with similar legislative goals coordinate their contributions to a candidate, the influ-
ence of their aggregate contribution is often greater than the sum of their individual con-
tributions).
256. SoRAUF, supra note 48, at 199 (noting that, even if candidates reject PAC contri-
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The perception that political committees or individuals drive a
candidate's political agenda through their control over contributions
is detrimental to voter participation.z" Reform that is focused on
increasing participation must reduce the financial influence of polit-
ical committees and wealthy individuals.
B. Outline for Reform
In light of the problems comprehensive reform poses, an in-
cremental reform of eliminating bundling is the best approach; it
would eliminate the most significant loophole in campaign finance
that currently exists. The benefits from curtailing the practice out-
weigh the benefits from allowing conduits and intermediaries to
continue such conduct." However, it would be impossible to
completely prevent individuals or organizations from raising funds
to support a candidate. Moreover, complete elimination of bundling
would be unconstitutional. 259
Incremental reform, however, may make effective regulation of
bundling possible. Several steps can be taken to modify the current
practice of bundling without requiring significant modification of
the current structure for funding campaigns. First, the phrase "di-
rection or control" must be defined. Second, current regulations
must be enforced to ensure candidates and committees are comply-
ing with them. Finally, new reporting requirements must be adopt-
ed.
1. Clarify Definition of "Direction or Control"
A clear definition of "direction or control" would resolve
many of the problems that exist in the current system.2' The lan-
guage of the regulation prohibits any direction or control from
being exerted over the contribution by a conduit or intermediary.
butions, they will often take contributions from individuals with ties to corporations, trade
organizations, or other actors that have PACs, so that the true interest represented by the
contribution is the same whether or not the contribution check is from an individual ac-
count or the account for the PAC).
257. See TIXEIRA, supra note 101, at 162 (arguing that in the current system, voter de-
tachment may be due to the perception that candidates and contributors are not "like us");
see also text accompanying notes 151-60.
258. See Bedlington, supra note 63, at 81 (stating that bundling "provides few benefits
in exchange for its costs").
259. See Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm.,
470 U.S. 480 (1985) (allowing independent expenditures by political action committees,
striking down aggregate expenditure limits as applied to spending by political committees).
260. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
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The FEC should return to the position it originally put forward in
AO 1975-1016' as a starting point for defining the phrase. The
Commission ruled that a conduit's request that a contributor ear-
mark a contribution for a specific candidate constituted "some
control," thus counting it as a contribution by, and against the
limits of, both the contributor and the conduit.262 If the Commis-
sioners are unwilling to rely on these early interpretations as prece-
dent, then they must overcome the partisan conflict that has pre-
vented consensus and develop a new definition of "direction or
control." The failure of the agency to clearly define this phrase
was noted by the court in Federal Election Commission v. National
Republican Senatorial Committee.263 It is difficult to understand
why the Commission has not clearly defined such an important
term in the twenty years since the statute was adopted.' Once
the phrase "direction or control" is defined, the courts will have
some guidance.
The opinion offered by the FEC in AO 19 8 1-57 's provides
additional precedent for improving the control over earmarked or
bundled contributions. The FEC determined that SSFs must report
earmarked contributions of participants to both the FEC and the
candidate.2" Earmarking and bundling are theoretically the same:
a third party encourages contributions by its affiliates to a specific
candidate or cause, the affiliates then forward their contributions to
the third party who collects the contributions and forwards them to
the candidate. AO 1981-57 offers an administrative approach to
regulating the contributions to candidates through conduits. Its
application should not be limited to SSFs but rather expanded to
include all entities that engage in earmarking or bundling. It is
important to note, however, that in AO 1981-57, the FEC did not
reach the issue of whether urging contributors to make contribu-
261. AO 1975-10, supra note 69; see also supra notes 69-75 (discussing the treatment
by the Commission of the "direction or control" requirement of 11 C.F.R. § 110.6(d)).
262. AO 1975-10, supra note 69.
263. 966 F.2d 1471, 1478 (D.C. Cir 1992)("It is enough to say that the Commission
has not . . . adopted such a construction.").
264. Id. at 1477 ("The Commission's precedents and statements, both preceding and
following the 1986 election, do not clearly establish what 'direction or control,'
means. . . . Mhe lack of precision is troubling.").
265. Earmarked Contributions via Payroll Deduction Plan (AO 1981-57), Fed. Election
Camp. Fin. Guide (CCH) 91 5636 (Jan. 25, 1982).
266. Id.
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tions to a candidate constitutes direction or control. 7 This does
not pose a problem in the application of the regulation if the focus
of regulation shifts from determining whether "direction or control"
over contributions has occurred to all fundraising by third party
conduits.
2. Better Enforcement of Current Regulations
As another step towards reform, we need better enforcement
of existing disclosure requirements for both the conduits and candi-
dates. In Buckley, the Supreme Court upheld disclosure require-
ments as constitutional. 8 The law currently requires political
committees to report all earmarked contributions that are greater
than $200 to both the FEC and the candidate." 9 By requiring po-
litical committees engaged in bundling to comply with the report-
ing provisions, we can more closely track contributions and the
conduits who generate them.270  In addition, as previously
noted,27 some members of Congress have been at least negligent
in failing to disclose information about contributors. Effective
enforcement of candidates' disclosures would improve the lack of
openness that exists in the identification of those who truly support
a candidate. If enforcement of disclosure requirements was quicker
and violators were swiftly sanctioned, then candidates would take
the initiative to ensure disclosure occurred. Prompt enforcement
would encourage compliance by candidates to prevent even the
appearance of scandal or impropriety that could be raised by oppo-
nents.
3. New Reporting Requirements
As the final step towards reform, the requirements for identifi-
cation2  should be modified to include additional information
about contributors. Also, there should be a lower threshold that
triggers the identification requirement.
267. Id.
268. In Buckley, the Court stated that "recordkeeping, reporting, and disclosure require-
ments are an essential means of gathering the data necessary to detect violations of the
contribution limitations described above. The disclosure requirements, as a general matter,
directly serve substantial governmental interests." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67-68
(1976).
269. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 13-22.
271. See supra note 189.
272. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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The identity of the conduit or intermediary transmitting the
individual's contribution to the candidate should be reported along
with the individual's occupation and employer. This information
would result in open disclosure of who and what groups support a
candidate. Also, if a contribution is made in connection with atten-
dance at a political fundraiser of any kind, the date and sponsor of
the event should also be disclosed. These two measures would
ensure that virtually all bundled contributions would be identified
as such whether the conduit was Charles Keating, the NRSC, or
EMILY's List. The burden would be placed not only on the bun-
dler to fully disclose their influence but also on the candidate to
disclose the identity of the candidate's support.
The threshold requiring identification of individual contributors
should be lowered. The current threshold of $200273 is high
enough to capture the large contributors but too high to require
disclosure by many groups who engage in massive bundling drives
to support candidates.274 The trigger for identification of contribu-
tors by intermediaries or conduits should be eliminated completely;
all contributions that have been bundled or earmarked should be
disclosed as such. This would not impose a significant burden on
intermediaries who bundle. As they are currently required to report
any individual who contributes more than $200, the process already
exists for the disclosure of these individuals.275 Additionally, such
a regulation would just change the current rule that allows disclo-
sure" to one that requires disclosure.
Stronger FEC guidance on who must disclose, improved dis-
closure requirements, and stricter enforcement of disclosure require-
ments are the best choices for reform of campaign finances. First,
they do not pose a significant disincentive to individuals to contrib-
ute and participate in elections.277 Next, enhanced disclosure im-
273. 2 U.S.C. § 434(b)(3)(A) (1994).
274. The fact that both EMILY's List and AMERICA'S List only require $200 a year
in aggregate contributions, see supra notes 209, 211, can be explained in two ways. Al-
though the groups may simply be trying to attract small contributors (by requiring a rela-
tively small commitment) who otherwise would not contribute to a candidate, the more
likely reason is that the groups can avoid reporting individual contributors to both the
FEC and the recipient candidate because such reporting is not required until the aggregate
annual contribution exceeds $200. See supra text accompanying notes 36-38.
275. See 2 U.S.C. § 434(b)(3)(A) (1994).
276. Id.
277. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 68 (acknowledging that although disclosure is intrusive and
may discourage some contributors from contributing, it does not place an excessive burden
on individuals).
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proves the evaluation of candidates and their supporters by opening
the fundraising process to public scrutiny, and deterring corruption
or the appearance of corruption." Finally, disclosure is clearly
constitutional and "the least restrictive means of curbing the evils
of campaign ignorance and corruption."279
VIII. CONCLUSION
As the "last frontier," bundling has proven to be a lucrative
means of circumventing federal election law. Significant improve-
ments in the way we conduct elections can be obtained by focus-
ing initially on improved regulation of conduits and intermediaries
that make large contributions to candidates through bundling other
people's money. The inability of Congress to effectively regulate
its own elections provides an incentive to abandon further attempts
at comprehensive reform. An incremental approach to reform would
produce immediate benefits and avoid many of the problems inher-
ent in attempts at comprehensive reform.
GEOFFREY M. WARDLE
278. The Supreme Court stated in Buckley that "[a] public armed with information about
a candidate's most generous supporters is better able to detect any post-election special
favors that may be given in return." Id. at 67. Additionally, the Court stated in a footnote
that "[w]e have said elsewhere that 'informed public opinion is the most potent of all
restraints upon misgovernment"' Id. at 67 n.79 (quoting Grosjean v. American Press Co.,
297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936)).
279. Id. at 68.
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